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INTRODUCTION
The debate surrounding the teaching of evolution in public
1
school science classes is constantly evolving. Indeed, the traditional
context for that debate is no longer sufficient to explain its legal and
political ramifications. For decades, arguments and judicial decisions
about evolution instruction have focused solely on whether different
approaches to teaching evolution violate the First Amendment’s Es2
tablishment Clause. The policy dimension of the debate has recently
turned toward what this Article describes as a “distributive model” of
evolution instruction. This distributive model requires a new analytical paradigm grounded not solely in the Establishment Clause, but in
a wider range of principles more commonly associated with administrative law.
Religiosity is a defining characteristic of American society and cul3
ture. Not surprisingly, then, questions about how to educate our

1

2

3

See On the Media: Darwin’s in the Details, Interview by Bob Garfield with Eugenie Scott, Exec. Dir. of the Nat’l Ctr. for Sci. Educ., et. al. (National Public Radio broadcast Apr. 3,
2009) [hereinafter “Darwin’s in the Details”] (statement of Eugenie C. Scott), available at
http://www.onthemedia.org/transcripts/2009/04/03/01?printable (stating the position
of evolution opponents is “evolving in response to the legal environment”).
U.S. CONST. amend I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . .”); see, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 109 (1968) (striking down Arkansas’s statutory ban on teaching evolution under the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment); Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 763 (M.D. Pa.
2005) (invalidating use of evolution disclaimer under the Establishment Clause almost
forty years after Epperson).
See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 674 (1984) (“There is an unbroken history of
official acknowledgment by all three branches of government of the role of religion in
American life from at least 1789.”); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952) (“We are
a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.”); Bauchman v. W.
High Sch., 132 F.3d 542, 554 (10th Cir. 1997) (“Courts have long recognized the historical, social and cultural significance of religion in our lives and in the world, generally.
Courts also have recognized that ‘a variety of motives and purposes are implicated’ by
government activity in a pluralistic society.” (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680)); Daniel O.
Conkle, The Path of American Religious Liberty: From the Original Theology to Formal Neutrality
and an Uncertain Future, 75 IND. L.J. 1, 31 (2000) (“[R]eligion not only influences politics
in the contemporary United States, but . . . religion [is incorporated into] politics to a
degree that may be unparalleled in the American past.”); Caroline Elizabeth Branch,
Comment, Unexcused Absence: Why Public Schools in Religiously Plural Society Must Save a Seat
for Religion in the Curriculum, 56 EMORY L.J. 1431, 1432 (2007) (“The United States is a society of myriad religious practices and perspectives . . . . Communities are expected to
discuss . . . policies that may implicate religious principles . . . . Such conversations are a
virtually unavoidable aspect of active political life in the United States.”); id. at 1433 (“Religion infuses American public life . . . .”). According to the U.S. Census Bureau, at least
80% of American adults in 2008 describe themselves as belonging to a religious denomination other than “Atheist, agnostic, and nothing in particular.” U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
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children frequently include discussions about whether and to what
degree religious ideas or influences may interact with public educa4
tion. The debate regarding how or whether to teach children about
scientific explanations of human origins on Earth is perhaps the most
5
well-recognized and impassioned of those discussions. It has become

4

5

THE
2010
STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT
88
tbl.75
(2010),
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2010edition.html (follow “1-77” hyperlink).
A recent and highly controversial issue in this debate involved changes made to the state
social studies and history curriculum by the Texas State Board of Education. The
changes included removing Thomas Jefferson from a list of “influential political philosopher[s] in a world history class,” and an attempt “to water down the rationale for the separation of church and state in a high school government class [by] pointing out that the
words were not in the Constitution and requiring that students compare and contrast the
judicial language with the wording in the First Amendment.” April Castro, Texas Board
Adopts
New
Social
Studies
Curriculum,
ABC
NEWS,
May
24,
2010,
http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=10706913; see also, e.g., Zelman v. SimmonsHarris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (upholding school voucher program); Good News Club v.
Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (concluding that permitting religious student
groups to use school facilities does not violate the Establishment Clause); Santa Fe Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (striking student-initiated and student-led prayer at
school).
Michael B. Berkman et al., Evolution and Creationism in America’s Classrooms: A National
Portrait, 6 PLOSBIOLOGY 920, 921 (2008), http://www.plosbiology.org/article/
info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pbio.0060124 (“Within American politics generally,
religious-based conflict is increasingly salient; even President Bush has expressed support
for teaching ‘both sides’ of the evolution controversy. But opposition to evolution can be
especially intense at the local level, where teachers live and work.” (citation omitted)); see
Yudhijit Bhattacharjee, Eugenie Scott Toils in Defense of Evolution, 324 SCIENCE 1250, 1250
(2009) (referring to the “contentious battle over teaching evolution in U.S. public
schools” over the last two decades); Glenn Branch, Understanding Creationism After Kitzmiller, 57 BIOSCIENCE 278, 284 (2007) (“[T]he teaching of evolution in the public schools
remains under siege.”); Richard B. Katskee, Why It Mattered to Dover That Intelligent Design
Isn’t Science, 5 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 112, 158 (2006) (stating that “no one doubts that
the [Kitzmiller] lawsuit constituted a major front in the culture war.”); Stephen A. Newman, Evolution and the Holy Ghost of Scopes: Can Science Lose the Next Round?, 8 RUTGERS
J.L. & RELIGION 11, *5 (2007) (“Evolution . . . remains the subject of passionate opposition in America.”); id. at *6 (“The legal battle over the teaching of evolution has raged for
over eighty years.”); Josh Rosenau, Don’t Mess with Textbooks, SEED MAG. (May 20, 2009),
http://seedmagazine.com/content/article/dont_mess_with_textbooks/ (“In the last two
years alone, 18 bills [similar to academic freedom bills] in 10 states have targeted the
teaching of evolution.”). It should also be noted that some prominent legal scholars have
advocated for a middle ground of sorts in the evolution instruction debate. Professor
Wexler, among others, has argued persuasively for the position that the “controversy”
over evolution should only be excluded from public school science classes, and that there
may well be a useful place for introducing students to the debate in comparative religion
or social studies classes. See Jay D. Wexler, Darwin, Design, and Disestablishment: Teaching
the Evolution Controversy in Public Schools, 56 VAND. L. REV. 751, 787 (2003) (describing as
an “improvement” a system where “history teachers could teach about the history of the
opposition to evolution in American history classes; civics teachers could teach about the
ongoing controversy over origins in those classes; philosophy teachers could teach about
the epistemological claims of science and religion there”); see also Alan I. Leshner, Editorial, Redefining Science, 309 SCIENCE 221 (2005) (“[I]t is appropriate to teach about be-
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so contentious that, for at least forty years, the federal courts have
been the predominant source of lasting resolutions to issues of evolu6
tion instruction. Despite the passion on both sides of the controver7
sy, the outcome has been overwhelmingly one-sided. Every challenged legislative or regulatory attempt to eliminate or curtail the
teaching of evolution in public school science classes has been invali8
dated by the courts under the Establishment Clause. As a result, opponents of teaching evolution have been forced to reevaluate and
9
transform their political strategy.
Recent political activity in the area provides a clear example. Evo10
lution opponents in at least twelve states have recently attempted,
with notable success in Texas and Louisiana, to enact measures that

6

7
8
9

10

lief-based concepts like ID [Intelligent Design] in humanities courses, in classes comparing religious points of view, or in philosophy courses that contrast religious and scientific
approaches to the world. However, what is taught in science class should be limited to
science.”).
See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (invalidating the Louisiana “balanced
treatment” act); Epperson, 393 U.S. at 97 (striking down ban on teaching evolution); Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ., 185 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 1999), reh’g denied, 201 F.3d
602 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1251 (2000) (striking a Louisiana evolution disclaimer); Daniel v. Waters, 515 F.2d 485 (6th Cir. 1975) (striking an antievolutionist statute
in Tennessee); Selman v. Cobb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 390 F. Supp. 2d 1286 (N.D. Ga. 2005)
(invalidating facially neutral evolution disclaimer); Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 707
(striking a Dover Area School District (Pennsylvania) evolution disclaimer); McLean v.
Ark. Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982) (invalidating Arkansas’ “balancedtreatment” statute); see also Nicholas A. Schuneman, One Nation, Under . . . The Watchmaker?: Intelligent Design and the Establishment Clause, 22 BYU J. PUB. L. 179, 179 (2007) (“For
nearly eighty years, American courts have mediated the debate between creationists and
evolutionists.”). That is not to say that political “solutions” have been entirely inconsequential, see, e.g., Press Release, Cobb County School District, Agreement Ends Textbook
Sticker Case (Dec. 19, 2006), available at http://ncseweb.net/webfm_send/878 (explaining the County’s decision to settle after losing at trial but winning a remand and new trial
on appeal as avoiding the “distraction and expense of starting all over”), but they have in
many cases proven to be remarkably fickle and temporary. See, e.g., Evolution Debate in
Kansas (12/4/06), AM. GEOLOGICAL INST. GOV’T AFFS. PROGRAM (Dec. 4, 2006),
http://www.agiweb.org/gap/evolution/KS.html (noting that as of 2006, “[t]he science
standards for public schools in Kansas have been rewritten five times in the past eight
years”).
See cases cited supra note 6. Since Epperson, every measure to combat evolution instruction has been invalidated by the federal courts under the Establishment Clause.
See cases cited supra note 6.
See, e.g., Newman, supra note 5, at *29 (“After the Supreme Court’s ruling in Epperson, the
term ‘creationism’ was replaced by the newly minted ‘creation science.’ When this renaming failed in McLean and in Edwards, the reference to ‘creation’ was jettisoned in favor of the next theoretical term, ‘intelligent design.’”); Schuneman, supra note 6, at 179
(describing the emergence of new political strategies in response to judicial decisions like
Epperson and Edwards striking antievolutionist policies).
For a more detailed description of those unsuccessful state efforts, see discussion infra
note 109.
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significantly depart from previous practice. While antievolutionist
strategy toward evolution instruction has always been dynamic in the
12
face of consistent rebukes by the federal courts, the policy measures
previously advanced by evolution opponents were widely applicable
legislative or regulatory mandates as to how human origins must be
13
taught in public school science classes. Although these measures
employed different methods, from prohibiting evolution instruction
outright to requiring that disclaimers be read to students about the
14
veracity of evolutionary theory, they all provided clear instructions
to educators. By contrast, recent enactments take what this Article
contends is a dramatic turn from the preceding legislative or quasilegislative prescriptions regarding evolution instruction toward a “distributive model” for addressing evolution questions, in which legislatures or regulators promulgate generalized statements that empower
and encourage local educators to set evolution instruction policy
through a series of individualized determinations about how evolution should be taught. This shift toward a distributive model supports
a corresponding shift in the way evolution instruction policy measures are evaluated from a pure Establishment Clause analysis to one
employing principles endemic to administrative law.
Changing perspective in this way does not require that traditional
analyses under the Establishment Clause be cast aside or otherwise

11

12

13

14

See Louisiana Science Education Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:285.1 (2008); 19 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE § 112.31–.41 (2009). The full text of Texas’ revised state science standards
is published in Chapter 112 of Title 19 of the Texas Administrative Code.
See Katskee, supra note 5, at 119 (“That legal strategy [by antievolutionists in Kitzmiller]
had its roots in a longstanding creationist program to exploit language in the Supreme
Court’s decision in Edwards v. Aguillard to circumvent Edwards’ [stet] holding barring the
teaching of biblical creationism . . . .”); Frank S. Ravitch, Playing the Proof Game: Intelligent
Design and the Law, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 841, 852 (2009) (explaining that after the
Court’s decision in Epperson, “[a]s creationism begat creation science, creation science
would soon beget a much more powerful offspring, Intelligent Design”); id. at 896 (describing the current state of evolution instruction policy as “primarily a response to cases
decided under the Establishment Clause”); Kevin Trowel, Note, Divided by Design: Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District, Intelligent Design, and Civic Education, 95 GEO. L.J.
855, 866 (2007) (“Creationism’s proponents have approached each legal defeat as an opportunity to reformulate the doctrine and to prepare it for future challenges.”).
As discussed infra Part II, evolution instruction policy has gone through a few discrete
stages since its reemergence as a controversial issue in Epperson, but prior to the most recent policy movement, all of the policy measures introduced to challenge evolution instruction took the form of generally applicable legal mandates to educators and students.
See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (“balanced treatment” act); Epperson
v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (prohibition); Selman v. Cobb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 390 F.
Supp. 2d 1286 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (disclaimer).
See, e.g., Epperson, 393 U.S. at 102–03; Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d
707 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
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discouraged, but instead allows for a more comprehensive understanding of the distributive model by opening it to consideration
from an administrative policy making as well as a broader constitutional vantage point, all of which implicates interesting and potentially damning questions about the model’s political and legal validity
that are not revealed by a conventional Establishment Clause analysis.
Part II of this Article briefly traces the history of the evolution debate.
Part III introduces the distributive model as the present manifestation of evolution instruction policy. Part IV argues that the model is
better understood by reference to administrative law principles, and
Part V demonstrates, without attempting to reach a definitive conclusion, how this fresh vantage point raises new issues of, inter alia, the
distributive model’s political legitimacy.
II. THE EVOLUTION INSTRUCTION DEBATE
The history of the evolution instruction debate has at least two
notable features. The development of evolution instruction policy
has been dynamic and essentially linear, with new approaches to limiting the teaching of evolution emerging in the place of judicially
15
invalidated policy measures. Only within the last decade have opponents of evolution instruction advanced a multi-faceted policy
16
agenda. Another historical feature of the evolution instruction debate is the doctrinal path followed by policy makers, courts, and
commentators in evaluating evolution education policy. This doctrinal path has been much more static and one-dimensional than its
policy counterpart, as evolution instruction issues have been treated

15

16

See, e.g., Chet K. W. Pager, The Establishment of Evolution: Public Courts and Public Classrooms, 81 TUL. L. REV. 17, 25 (2006) (explaining that after the Court struck Arkansas’ ban
on teaching evolution, “[a]s a frontal assault on education was no longer constitutionally
valid, creationists were forced to adopt increasingly nuanced strategies” in the evolution
instruction debate); id. at 56–57 (pointing out that the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence “provides a framework for antievolutionists to refine their strategies in ways
which meet their goals yet are in accordance with judicial doctrine”).
See Deborah A. Reule, Note, The New Face of Creationism: The Establishment Clause and the
Latest Efforts to Suppress Evolution in Public Schools, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2555, 2581–88 (2001)
(identifying and examining in detail the three general means of combating evolution
post-Edwards: removing evolution from state science curricula; including evolution disclaimers in science classes and texts; and teaching intelligent design); Schuneman, supra
note 6, at 179 (describing the “third era” of evolution instruction policy as including “attempts to eliminate evolutionary theory from standardized tests, the use of disclaimers . . . and the presentation of scientific and philosophical ‘evidence’ against evolution”).
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exclusively as questions of religious establishment under the First
17
Amendment.
The debate over evolution instruction in public schools is a subset
of the broader debate about the relationship between Darwinian evo18
lution and religious faith, a debate as old as Darwinism itself. Although he was not the first evolutionist—the theory can be traced to
the fifth century BCE and attributed to such prominent thinkers as
19
20
Empedocles and Aristotle, as well as to Darwin’s contemporaries —
21
Darwin’s support for the theory of natural selection made his evolu17

18

19
20
21

There is also support for the proposition that opponents of evolution instruction have
historically been—and continue to be—religiously motivated in their criticisms of evolution and its inclusion in public school science curricula. See, e.g., Selman v. Cobb Cnty.
Sch. Dist., 390 F. Supp. 2d 1286, 1311 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (invalidating a facially-neutral evolution disclaimer on the grounds that “religiously-motivated individuals have specifically
asked school boards to . . . adopt[] this specific language, . . . [and] the Cobb County
School Board appears to have sided with these religiously-motivated individuals”); Bhattacharjee, supra note 5, at 1250 (describing recent “assaults on science standards” as “closet
creationism being introduced through wording not obvious to those unfamiliar with the
history of the controversy”); Gordy Slack, The Evolution of Creationism, SALON (Nov. 13,
2007), http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2007/11/13/intelligent_design/index.html
[hereinafter Slack, The Evolution of Creationism] (arguing that religiously-motivated creation science “adapted” to unfavorable judicial rulings by “cutting God off its letterhead
and calling itself ‘intelligent design’”). While this is an important issue in terms of evaluating evolution instruction policy under the Establishment Clause, see, e.g., Edwards, 482
U.S. at 585, 591 (defining the purpose prong of Lemon as prohibiting statutes that intend
to advance religion and explaining that the statute at issue could not withstand constitutional scrutiny because its “preeminent purpose . . . was clearly to advance the religious
viewpoint that a supernatural being created humankind”); McLean v. Ark. Bd. of Educ.,
529 F. Supp. 1255, 1261, 1263 (E.D. Ark. 1982) (invalidating Arkansas’ balanced treatment statute based on the conclusion that it was part of a “religious crusade . . . motivated
by opposition to the theory of evolution and [a] desire to see [creationism] taught in the
public schools,” and because one of the statute’s sponsors was “motivated solely by his religious beliefs and his desire to see the Biblical version of creation taught in the public
schools”), it is less significant for purposes of this discussion, which focuses on nonEstablishment Clause contexts for considering questions about the teaching of evolution.
It is sufficient for this Article to acknowledge that the doctrinal history of the evolution
instruction debate has to date been singularly religious, regardless of the motivations of
antievolutionist policy makers.
Joan DelFattore, Speaking of Evolution: The Historical Context of Kitzmiller v. Dover Area
School District, 9 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 1, 29 (2007) (“As soon as On the Origin of Species was published, a debate about its relationship to religious faith erupted . . . .”).
See RANDY MOORE, EVOLUTION IN THE COURTROOM: A REFERENCE GUIDE 114, 151 (2002);
GEORGE E. WEBB, THE EVOLUTION CONTROVERSY IN AMERICA 1 (1994).
See MOORE, supra note 19 (explaining that Darwin’s grandfather, Erasmus Darwin, and his
contemporary, Alfred Wallace, made contributions to the study of evolution).
Natural selection, more colloquially referred to as “survival of the fittest,” is the theory
that organisms “evolved” by adapting to their environments in ways that facilitated their
survival. See CHARLES DARWIN, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES (1859).
Darwin was the first to propose that the evolution of species was due to the relative
advantage conveyed to certain phenotypic variations within a species—those better
suited to survival and reproduction will reproduce more often, according to Dar-
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tionary theory immediately and highly controversial as a challenge to
deeply-held religious beliefs about human origins, in particular the
22
biblical story of creation. From its Darwinist beginnings, therefore,
the debate about how humans originated on Earth has been rooted
23
in contentions about the relationship between religion and science.
The dispute about evolution instruction in public schools
emerged from this broader debate and followed a similarly religious
path. Following World War I, a fundamentalist Christian revival be24
gan in response to the perceived moral degradation of society. One
25
of the primary targets of this new fundamentalism was evolution,
which the movement’s adherents considered “unscientific and dan26
gerous” due principally to its inconsistency with creationism. Fundamentalists’ chosen forum in which to challenge evolutionary theory
27
was in America’s public schools, where the issue for lawmakers and

22

23
24

25

26

27

win, thus leading to a predominance of the advantageous phenotypic variation in
subsequent generations. In other words, optimal phenotypes emerged and gained
dominance through a process of unguided survival of the fittest, otherwise known
as “natural selection.”
Schuneman, supra note 6, at 18,384 (citing NEIL A. CAMPBELL, BIOLOGY 427–28 (3d ed.
1993)).
DelFattore, supra note 18, at 37 (noting that “any comprehensive consideration of Victorian-era opposition to Darwinism must pay serious attention to the question of the relationship between religion and science”). Professor DelFattore also notes that the most
strident conflict between religion and science surrounding evolution “is largely limited to
fundamentalist Christians and confined to the undeniable statement that the theory of
evolution does not bear out a literal reading of Genesis.” Id.
Id. at 29 (“As soon as On the Origin of Species was published, a debate about its relationship
to religious faith erupted . . . .”).
See EDWARD J. LARSON, SUMMER FOR THE GODS: THE SCOPES TRIAL AND AMERICA’S
CONTINUING DEBATE OVER SCIENCE AND RELIGION 32–37 (1997); Pager, supra note 15, at
21 (describing the “religious revival in the 1920’s” because “church leaders were concerned with the moral decline of America following the First World War”).
See McLean v. Ark. Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1258–59 (E.D. Ark. 1982) (explaining
that “[t]he religious movement known as Fundamentalism began in nineteenth century
America as part of evangelical Protestantism’s response to social changes, new religious
thought and Darwinism. . . . Following World War I . . . Fundamentalism focused on evolution as responsible for [a perceived decline in traditional morality]”).
Joyce F. Francis, Comment, Creationism v. Evolution: The Legal History and Tennessee’s Role
in that History, 63 TENN. L. REV. 753, 755 (1996). Creationism is adherence to the account
of human origins in the Book of Genesis. See N. Patrick Murray & Neil D. Buffaloe, Creationism and Evolution: The Real Issues, in EVOLUTION VERSUS CREATIONISM: THE PUBLIC
EDUCATION CONTROVERSY 454 (J. Peter Zetterberg ed., 1983) (“[Creationism is defined
as] the viewpoint that the literal Biblical account of creation is the correct explanation for
the origin of the earth and its living forms.”).
Derek H. Davis, Kansas Versus Darwin: Examining the History and Future of the CreationismEvolution Controversy in American Public Schools, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 205, 212 (1999)
(describing the conflict between Darwinism and the rise to prominence of Christian fundamentalism in the early twentieth century, and explaining that during that period crea-
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judges remained how to resolve the tension between religious and
scientific explanations of human origins.
A. Religiously Explicit Policies
During the 1920s, Oklahoma, Mississippi, Arkansas, Florida, Texas, and Tennessee all passed laws designed to prevent the teaching of
28
evolution in public schools. Evolutionists brought the first—and
perhaps still most well-known—legal challenge on the subject to the
Tennessee Supreme Court in 1927 in the famous Scopes Monkey Tri29
al. The Tennessee Anti-Evolution Act prohibited the teaching of
“any theory that denies the story of the divine creation of man as
30
taught in the Bible . . . .” At trial, the court effectively precluded either party from presenting scientific evidence, making it “inevitable
that most of the case would deal with the clash between science and
31
religion as viewed by fundamentalist creationists.” Despite the fact
that the United States Supreme Court had yet to incorporate the First
32
Amendment against the states, defendant John T. Scopes challenged (unsuccessfully) the constitutionality of the Act on religious
33
grounds under the state constitution. Although the trial constituted
a legal victory for antievolutionists, it was a loss for the movement in
34
the court of public opinion, and the issue was largely relegated to
35
local attempts to discourage the teaching of evolution after 1928.

28
29
30
31
32

33
34

35

tionists “declared war on the evolutionists, a war whose biggest battlefield would become
the nation’s public schools”).
Pager, supra note 15, at 22.
See Scopes v. State, 278 S.W. 57 (Tenn. 1925), rev’d on other grounds, 289 S.W. 363 (Tenn.
1927).
Scopes, 289 S.W. at 363–64 n.1.
DelFattore, supra note 18, at 44.
The Supreme Court first incorporated the First Amendment into the Fourteenth
Amendment in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940):
The fundamental concept of liberty embodied in [the Fourteenth] Amendment
embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment. The First Amendment declares that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment has
rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact such
laws.
Id. at 303.
See Scopes v. State, 278 S.W. 57 (Tenn. 1925), rev’d on other grounds, 289 S.W. 363 (Tenn.
1927); DelFattore, supra note 18, at 46–47.
See Pager, supra note 15, at 23 (explaining that after the decision in Scopes, “Tennessee was
broadly perceived as laughably backward, antievolutionist sentiment subsided, and few
states attempted similar statutes”).
See Reule, supra note 16, at 2570 (citing DOROTHY NELKIN, THE CREATION CONTROVERSY:
SCIENCE OR SCRIPTURE IN THE SCHOOLS 33 (1982)). The statute that would give rise to
the next great legal battle over evolution instruction was already on the books in Arkan-
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Forty years later, the controversy resurfaced in Epperson v. Arkan36
sas with a challenge to an Arkansas statute prohibiting teaching that
37
humankind “ascended or descended from a lower order of animals.”
The trial court, like its counterpart in Scopes, refused to permit scientific evidence in support of evolution, instead focusing on the damage that teaching evolution would do to religious values in the com38
munity.
The Supreme Court struck down the statute under the
Establishment Clause—which after Scopes had been incorporated
39
against the states —because it prohibited teaching evolution “for the
sole reason that it is deemed to conflict with a . . . particular interpre40
tation of the Book of Genesis by a particular religious group.” Epperson altered antievolutionists’ policy focus from outright bans on
teaching evolution to the concept of “scientific creationism,” the view
41
that the biblical creation account can be supported scientifically.
The initial vehicle for promoting scientific creationism was balanced treatment legislation, which required that scientific creation42
ism and evolution be taught side-by-side. Arkansas adopted a ba43
lanced treatment statute in 1981 which was based on the model
Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science Act by crea44
tionist Paul Ellwanger. Supporters of evolution instruction promptly

36
37
38
39
40
41

42

43
44

sas. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 109 n.17 (1968) (noting that “Arkansas’ law
was adopted by popular initiative in 1928, three years after Tennessee’s law was enacted
and one year after the Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision in the Scopes case”).
393 U.S. at 97.
Id. at 99.
See MOORE, supra note 19, at 52.
See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (applying the First Amendment against
the states through its incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment).
Epperson, 393 U.S. at 103.
See McLean v. Ark. Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1259 (E.D. Ark. 1982) (“In the 1960’s
and early 1970’s, several Fundamentalist organizations were formed to promote the idea
that the Book of Genesis was supported by scientific data. The terms ‘creation science’
and ‘scientific creationism’ have been adopted by these Fundamentalists as descriptive of
their study of creation and the origins of man.”); Chris Mooney, The Dover Monkey Trial,
SEED
MAG.,
(Oct.
1,
2005),
http://seedmagazine.com/content/article/
the_dover_monkey_trial/ (“In the wake of [Epperson], the anti-evolutionist legal strategy
advocated ‘equal time’ legislation . . . .”).
See McLean, 529 F. Supp. at 1261–63 (noting that the balanced treatment legislation at
issue was prepared by the founder of a Fundamentalist organization and was designed to
avoid the constitutional trappings of prior evolution statutes); Reule, supra note 16, at
2573 n.124 (explaining that the balanced treatment legislation at issue in McLean was
“specifically designed to avoid conflict with the First Amendment” in light of Epperson).
See Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution Science Act, ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 80-1663 (1981 Supp.).
See CREATIONISM, SCIENCE AND THE LAW: THE ARKANSAS CASE 1 (Marshall C. LaFollette
ed., 1983).
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challenged the Act as unconstitutional in McLean v. Arkansas. Although the district court in McLean permitted both sides to present
expert scientific testimony at trial, the statute was invalidated on fa46
miliar Establishment Clause grounds, namely because the creation
science information and arguments presented to the court “simply
omit Biblical references” without changing the Act’s religious “con47
tent and message.”
Five years later, the Supreme Court invalidated a Louisiana statute
48
on similar grounds. After McLean, Louisiana passed a revised balanced treatment statute that defined creation science as “scientific
evidences for creation and inferences from those scientific evi49
dences.” After hearing a wide range of arguments from both sides,
including arguments based on the scientific validity of creation
science and evolution, the Court held that the statute violated the Establishment Clause because its actual purpose was to “change the
science curriculum . . . to provide persuasive advantage to a particular
50
religious doctrine that rejects . . . evolution in its entirety.” Unable
to rely on balanced treatment legislation, evolution opponents were
again forced to recreate their approach to combating evolution in51
struction in public schools.
The response was a form of evolution disclaimer, a statement that
is read to students or placed in science textbooks by school officials
52
and that questions the validity of evolutionary theory. A Louisiana
45
46
47
48

49
50
51

52

529 F. Supp. at 1255.
Id.
Id. at 1271.
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 586 (1987) (invalidating the Louisiana Balanced
Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science in Public School Instruction Act,
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:286.1–.7).
Aguillard v. Treen, 634 F. Supp. 426, 429 (E.D. La. 1985). The case was renamed when
Edwin Edwards succeeded David Treen as governor of Louisiana.
Edwards, 482 U.S. at 592.
See Mooney, supra note 41, at 31 (“With their ‘creation science’ strategies struck down by
the Supreme Court, anti-evolutionists almost immediately launched another tactic: they
morphed into defenders of ‘intelligent design.’”).
Professor Wright describes evolution textbook disclaimers by explaining that:
As the caselaw has developed, there is no absolute uniformity as to the language
of evolution textbook disclaimers. However, a typical such disclaimer may read as
follows: ‘This textbook contains material on evolution. Evolution is a theory, not a
fact, regarding the origin of living things. This material should be approached
with an open mind, studied carefully, and critically considered.’”
R. George Wright, Your Mileage May Vary: A General Theory of Legal Disclaimers, 7 PIERCE L.
REV. 85, 103–04 (2008). The disclaimer in Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Board of Education
stated:
It is hereby recognized by the Tangipahoa Board of Education, that the lesson to
be presented, regarding the origin of life and matter, is known as the Scientific
Theory of Evolution and should be presented to inform students of the scientific
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school board enacted a requirement that teachers read a statement to
science students before they begin studying evolution. The statement
explained that the teaching of evolution was not intended to discourage their belief in the “Biblical version of Creation” or any other
concept of human origins and encouraged students to form their
53
own opinions or adhere to those of their parents. The district court
in Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Board of Education invalidated the dis54
claimer and the circuit court affirmed, ruling that the statement
conferred an unconstitutional benefit on a religious doctrine under
55
the Establishment Clause. The Supreme Court declined to grant
certiorari, but did so over Justice Scalia’s dissent on behalf of three
56
members of the Court, perhaps signaling to evolution opponents
that less religiously explicit critiques of evolutionary theory would be
57
more likely to survive an Establishment Clause challenge.
B. Facially Neutral Challenges
Regardless of whether it was, in fact, a reaction to Justice Scalia’s
dissent, Freiler represents an era in the evolution instruction debate
when opponents of evolution instruction shifted from religiously explicit attempts to discourage or supplement evolution instruction to
58
facially neutral ones. This shift can be seen in the emergence of the

53

54
55
56
57

58

concept and not intended to influence or dissuade the Biblical version of Creation
or any other concept.
It is further recognized by the Board of Education that it is the basic right and privilege of each student to form his/her own opinion or maintain beliefs taught by
parents on this very important matter of the origin of life and matter. Students
are urged to exercise critical thinking and gather all information possible and
closely examine each alternative toward forming an opinion.
975 F. Supp. 819, 821 (E.D. La. 1997).
See id. at 821 (evaluating a disclaimer to be read to public school science students immediately before a unit of study in which “the scientific theory of evolution is to be presented”).
Id.
Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ., 185 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 1999), reh’g denied, 201
F.3d 602 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1251 (2000).
See Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ. v. Freiler, 530 U.S. 1251 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(denying certiorari).
See id. at 1253 (arguing that the evolution disclaimer satisfied the effects prong of the
Lemon test, despite its explicit use of creationism as an “illustrative example”) (emphasis in
original).
Compare Freiler, 975 F. Supp. at 821 (considering a disclaimer explaining to students that
the teaching of evolution was not intended to discourage their belief in the “Biblical version of Creation”), with Selman v. Cobb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 390 F. Supp. 2d 1286, 1292 (N.D.
Ga. 2005) (evaluating a requirement that a sticker be placed in high school biology textbooks stating that evolution “is a theory, not a fact,” and “should be approached with an
open mind, studied carefully, and critically considered”). This shift is also evident in the
public statements made by prominent evolution opponents like the Discovery Institute
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“Teach the Controversy” movement at the turn of the century. Proponents of this new approach advocated for revised evolution disclaimers in light of Freiler, teaching intelligent design as an alternative
60
theory to evolution, and revising state science standards to deem61
phasize or otherwise discourage evolution instruction. These approaches are notable because they do not include any mention of a
particular religion or religious doctrine. They challenge evolution
instruction by either discouraging student exposure to or confidence
in the veracity of Darwin’s theory, or by advancing an “alternative”
explanation of human origins that claims to be scientific rather than
62
religious.
After Freiler, two facially neutral evolution disclaimers were
enacted in two separate states, and both were challenged in federal
court. In 2004, a school district in Cobb County, Georgia required
that a sticker be placed in high school biology textbooks stating that
evolution “is a theory, not a fact,” and “should be approached with an

59

60

61

62

Center for Science and Culture. In 1999, an internal document outlining the Center’s
new Wedge Strategy for challenging evolution instruction described the Center’s mission
as “[seeking] to reverse the stifling dominance of the materialist worldview [including
evolution theory], and to replace it with a science consonant with Christian and theistic
convictions.” DISCOVERY INST. CTR. FOR THE RENEWAL OF SCI. & CULTURE, The Wedge Strategy, ANTIEVOLUTION.ORG, http://www.antievolution.org/features/wedge.html (last visited
Oct. 9, 2010) [hereinafter DISCOVERY INSTITUTE, Wedge Strategy]. In 2009, the same Center for Science and Culture described itself as a program designed to “support[] research
by scientists and other scholars” into alternatives to Darwinian evolution and to “encourage[] schools to improve science education” by teaching students about the “scientific
weaknesses” of evolutionary theory. See DISCOVERY INST. CTR. SCI. & CULTURE,
http://www.discovery.org/csc/aboutCSC.php (last visited Oct. 9, 2010).
Eugenie C. Scott, What’s Wrong with the “Teach the Controversy” Slogan?, 42 MCGILL J. EDUC.
307, 312 (2007) (“During the early 2000s the Discovery Institute refocused its efforts from
promoting [intelligent design] to concentrating on the ‘weaknesses of evolution.’ . . .
This was the origin of the ‘Teach the Controversy’ slogan . . . .”); Slack, The Evolution of
Creationism, supra note 17, at 1–2 (“Teach the controversy is the new mantra of the [intelligent design] movement.”); Darwin’s in the Details, supra note 1 (statement of Casey
Luskin) (supporting “teaching evolution in [a] manner that allows students to ask hard
questions and really investigate and analyze the issues [relating to the] . . . scientific controversy over evolution”).
See Top Questions, DISCOVERY INST. CTR. SCI. & CULTURE, http://www.discovery.org/
csc/topQuestions.php (last visited Oct. 9, 2010) (defining the theory of intelligent design
as holding “that certain features of the universe and of living things are best explained by
an intelligent cause, not an undirected process such as natural selection”).
See Reule, supra note 16, at 2581–88 (identifying and examining in detail the three general means of combating evolution post-Edwards: removing evolution from state science
curricula; evolution disclaimers in science classes and texts; and teaching intelligent design).
This is different from balanced treatment statutes, which attempted to support an overtly
religious position on scientific grounds.
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open mind, studied carefully, and critically considered.” Despite the
disclaimer’s silence as to any religious doctrine or language, the dis64
trict court in Selman v. Cobb County School District invalidated the disclaimer under the Establishment Clause because it conveyed the message that those who “oppose evolution for religious reasons . . . are
65
favored members of the political community.” Shortly after the Selman decision, a district court in Pennsylvania considered an Establishment Clause challenge to a requirement that school officials read
a statement to ninth grade science students that evolution is “not a
fact,” and that “[g]aps in the [t]heory exist for which there is no evi66
dence.” The statement went on to mention intelligent design as an
alternative to evolution and referred students to its reference book
67
for more information on the topic. The district court struck the disclaimer as a violation of the Establishment Clause, primarily on the
grounds that a reasonable observer would conclude that the disclaimer—including its reference to the theory of intelligent design—was
68
intended to promote a religious agenda. Although the disclaimers
63

64
65
66
67

68

Selman v. Cobb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 390 F. Supp. 2d 1286, 1292 (N.D. Ga. 2005), vacated and
remanded by 449 F.3d 1320, 1338 (2006) (requiring additional facts to be developed on the
record, but explicitly stating that “we do not intend to make any implicit rulings on any of
the legal issues that arise from the facts once they are found on remand. We intend no
holding on any of the legal premises that may have shaped the district court’s conclusions
on the three Lemon prongs”).
Selman, 390 F. Supp. 2d at 1286.
Id. at 1306.
Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 708 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
See id. at 708–09 (explaining that the intelligent design “reference book, Of Pandas and
People, is available for students” to see if they would like to explore this view). Intelligent
design is a theory of human origins based on the idea that human development was
guided by an “intelligent designer” rather than Darwinian natural selection. See also Top
Questions, supra note 60 (“The theory of intelligent design holds that certain features of
the universe and of living things are best explained by an intelligent cause, not an undirected process such as natural selection.”). It is not overtly religious in the sense that it
does not expressly invoke any existing religious doctrine or authority to support its assertions.
Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 728 (“An objective student is also presumed to know that the
Dover School Board advocated for the . . . disclaimer in expressly religious terms . . . and
that the Board adopted the [intelligent design] Policy in furtherance of an expressly religious agenda.”); see also id. (“[T]he objective student is presumed to know that encouraging the teaching of evolution as a theory rather than as a fact is one of the latest strategies
to dilute evolution instruction employed by anti-evolutionists with religious motivations.”
(citing Selman, 390 F. Supp. 2d at 1308)). The Kitzmiller court also concluded that a reasonable observer would understand that intelligent design is “an interesting theological
argument, but that it is not science,” and that its reference book posits that God is the
“master intellect” behind human existence. Id. at 718, 745–46. But see Arnold H. Loewy,
The Wisdom and Constitutionality of Teaching Intelligent Design in Public Schools, 5 FIRST
AMEND. L. REV. 82, 88 (2006) (arguing that “teaching intelligent design in public schools
is constitutional (outside of the unusual context of the Kitzmiller situation)”).
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at issue in Selman and Kitzmiller were silent with respect to creationism
or any other overtly religious explanation of human origins, both
were challenged and adjudged solely under the Establishment
Clause, confirming the one-dimensional nature of evolution instruction’s doctrinal history; even when the debate avoids religious language, evolution instruction is treated as a religious issue.
The federal courts’ negative treatment of evolution disclaimers
69
and intelligent design has left the third method of “teaching the
controversy,” described generally as the move to revise state science
70
standards, as the most legally and politically promising. Historically,
efforts at revising science curricula have stopped short of explicitly
71
72
prohibiting evolution instruction in favor of more subtle, less con-

69

70
71

In addition to its negative treatment in the courts, there is powerful political evidence
supporting the conclusion that intelligent design is not likely to play a significant role in
antievolutionist strategy going forward. See, e.g., PAUL R. GROSS ET AL., THOMAS B.
FORDHAM INST., THE STATE OF STATE SCIENCE STANDARDS 15 (2005), available at
http://www.edexcellence.net/institute/publication/publication.cfm?id =352 (citing disclaimers, rather than intelligent design, as the primary means of response by antievolutionists seeking to discredit evolution); Claudia Wallis, The Evolution Wars, TIME,
Aug. 15, 2005, at 27, 30 (explaining that creationists are focusing on “attempting to get
criticism of Darwinian evolution in the science standards, not intelligent design” (internal
quotation marks omitted)). There has yet to be a law enacted that requires intelligent
design instruction in public school science classes, and antievolutionists denounced that
prospect in favor of evolution disclaimers. See Mooney, supra note 41, at 32 (discussing
how advocates of intelligent design are not pushing for intelligent design instruction, but
instead are seeking to require that public schools “teach the controversy"); Marilyn Rauber, Creationists Try to Edge Around Ban, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Dec. 5, 2004 (explaining that “the tactic that most worries supporters of evolution is the use of antievolution disclaimers,” rather than the introduction of intelligent design).
This is not to say, however, that intelligent design does not continue to capture the
interest of participants in the evolution instruction debate. See DISCOVERY INST. CTR. SCI.
& CULTURE, supra note 58 (stating as one of the four goals of the program to “support[]
research by scientists and other scholars developing the scientific theory known as intelligent design”); Bhattacharjee, supra note 5, at 1250 (explaining that the battle over evolution still includes intelligent design). In the last three years alone, more than thirty law
review articles have been published with the phrase “intelligent design” in the title. For
purposes of this discussion, however, it is sufficient to note that, as a matter of political
strategy, the promotion of intelligent design theory appears to have fallen out of favor
with antievolutionists.
See Reule, supra note 16, at 2581–88 (identifying and examining in detail the three general means of combating evolution post-Edwards).
Although Kansas, Mississippi, West Virginia, and Tennessee have at one time come close
to prohibiting evolution instruction in their state science standards, see Lawrence S. Lerner, Teaching Evolution State by State, FREETHOUGHT TODAY, Jan.–Feb. 2001,
http://www.ffrf.org/fttoday/2001/jan_feb01/lerner.html (explaining that, as of February 2001, four states (Kansas, Mississippi, Tennessee, and West Virginia) had state science
standards that “ignore evolution completely”), there are currently no states that omit all
treatment of evolutionary theory from their state science curricula. As of December,
2005, however, five states—Florida, Kentucky, Mississippi, Oklahoma, and South Dako-
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stitutionally-suspect measures. The policy-level battle over state
science standards has come to parallel the development of evolution
disclaimers; revised science standards target the veracity of evolutionary theory while remaining facially neutral with regard to religion.
For instance, Texas, the nation’s largest purchaser of science textbooks and thus a highly influential force in the direction of public
73
science education nationally, until recently included language in its
science standards requiring that educators introduce students to the
“strengths and weaknesses” of scientific theories, including evolu74
tion. This was called the “strengths and weaknesses strategy” by its

72

73

74

ta—had standards that used the term “evolution” either sparingly or not at all, instead
choosing phrases such as “change over time,” and as many as thirteen States had adopted
a treatment of evolution described as “useless, disguised, or absent.” GROSS ET AL., supra
note 69, at 15, 34, 40, 46–47, 57, 61.
It may appear at first glance that the distinction between measures like evolution disclaimers and teaching intelligent design on the one hand and revised state science standards
on the other is nominal at best, and that evolution disclaimers and intelligent design instruction could themselves be achieved through a shift in state science standards. While
on a macro level this is true—a revision of state science standards could be used to prohibit evolution instruction altogether, let alone require the teaching of intelligent design—
for purposes of this discussion, the revision of state science standards is meant in contrast
to what would traditionally be legislative measures, such as a requirement that disclaimers
be used or intelligent design be taught in science classes. Put another way, the process of
revising state science standards is used here to refer to a more indirect approach to influencing evolution instruction by changing the guidelines and overarching priorities of
the state science curriculum, rather than mandating specific conduct. Although the same
political actors may participate in, for example, enacting an evolution disclaimer and setting learning goals for science students, the former is considered herein to be something
beyond a mere revision of state science standards, while the latter is not. Professor Bowman described this distinction as follows:
Standards do not establish a statewide curriculum in that they do not dictate which
textbooks must be used or which assignments or methods of in-class assessment
must be employed, yet they do establish a substantive instructional framework.
The content of a state’s standards explicitly is intended to influence the instruction students receive, and to do so at a low cost, compared to many other methods
of educational reform.
Kristi L. Bowman, An Empirical Study of Evolution, Creationism, and Intelligent Design Instruction in Public Schools, 36 J.L. & EDUC. 301, 310–11 (2007) (citing GROSS ET AL., supra note
69),
available
at
http://www.edexcellence.net/institute/publication/publication.
cfm?id=352.
See April Castro, Texas Ed Board Approves Science Standards, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 27,
2009, http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/ap/tx/6346723.html; Darwin’s in the Details, supra note 1 (statement of Bob Garfield) (point out that “since Texas buys
more . . . textbooks than any other state, it influences [the content of] books everywhere”).
See Castro, supra note 73 (describing the omission in Texas’ new science standards of the
“20-year-old requirement that both ‘strengths and weaknesses’ of all scientific theories be
taught” in Texas); Texas Improves on Strengths and Weaknesses Language in Science Standards
on Teaching Evolution, DISCOVERY INST. CTR. SCI. & CULTURE (Mar. 29, 2009),
http://www.discovery.org/a/9851.
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75

critics, who claim that despite its facial neutrality, it is in fact moti76
vated by a desire to introduce creationism into the classroom. Facially-neutral state science standards like the “strengths and weaknesses strategy” fit nicely into the overall historical narrative of the
evolution instruction debate. The use of multiple approaches, such
as evolution disclaimers, intelligent design instruction, and revised
standards, is consistent with the dynamic history of evolution education policy, and the continued focus by advocates and commentators
on the Establishment Clause as the sole legal context for evaluating
new evolution instruction policies is a continuation of the debate’s
77
monolithic doctrinal pedigree. Although the “strengths and weak75

76

77

Gordy Slack, Texas on Evolution:
Needs Further Study, SALON (Mar. 28, 2009),
http://www.salon.com/env/feature/2009/03/28/texas_evolution_case/index.html [hereinafter Slack, Texas on Evolution] (stating that after the court in Kitzmiller indicated that
intelligent design was a religious, rather than scientific, concept, and thus unconstitutional as a subject to be taught in public schools, “advocates of teaching neo-creationism
have been forced to seek other ways into public science classrooms. Enter the ‘strengths
and weaknesses’ strategy, crafted by the Seattle-based, pro-intelligent-design think thank
[sic], Discovery Institute”).
See Castro, supra note 73 (“The words strengths and weaknesses have become ‘code for
creationism and (the similar theory of) intelligent design,’ said [Texas State Board of
Education] member Barbara Cargill.”); Slack, Texas on Evolution, supra note 75 (quoting
“Eugenie Scott, Director of the National Center for Science Education” as saying that the
alternative to the creationist strengths and weaknesses strategy was “to continue amending the standards to achieve through the backdoor what they couldn’t achieve up front”)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
The legal scholarship on evolution instruction has focused almost exclusively on the constitutionality of teaching evolution under the Establishment Clause. See Bowman, supra
note 72, at 317 (“[T]he constitutional tests that are most often considered to be the focus
of a legal analysis of creationism or intelligent design instruction . . . all ask whether the
government is supporting religion; not surprisingly, legal scholarship, too, has focused on
the same question.”); David Crump, Natural Selection, Irreducible Complexity, and the Bacterial
Flagellum: A Contrarian Approach to the Intelligent Design Debate, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 10 (2008)
(describing the Establishment Clause as the “principal basis of legal objections to the
consideration of irreducible complexity theory in public schools”); see also David R. Bauer, Note, Resolving the Controversy over “Teaching the Controversy”: The Constitutionality of
Teaching Intelligent Design in Public Schools, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1019, 1040–43, 1046–50
(2006) (reviewing the evolution instruction literature and revealing its focus on the Establishment Clause). This remained true even after the development and adoption in
Louisiana and Texas of the “distributive model,” the most recent policy measure advanced by evolution opponents. See discussion infra Part III (describing the distributive
model); see also Jana R. McCreary, This is the Trap the Courts Built: Dealing with the Entanglement of Religion and the Origin of Life in American Public Schools, 37 SW. U. L. REV. 1, 3–4
(2008) (arguing that allowing the teaching of evolution in schools at the exclusion of
other doctrines violates the Establishment Clause); Barry P. McDonald, Getting Beyond Religion as Science: “Unstifling” Worldview Formation in American Public Education, 66 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 587, 588 (2009) (offering a new approach to teaching human origins in public schools and arguing that it is constitutionally viable under the Establishment Clause);
Ravitch, supra note 12, at 875 (noting the role of other First Amendment principles such
as the “public forum doctrine” and “equal access concept” in the debate over intelligent
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nesses” language was omitted from the 2009 version of Texas’ state
science standards without having ever been challenged in the
78
courts, it foreshadowed the current campaign in Texas and elsewhere around the country to modify state science standards to combat evolution instruction and the resultant debate over the religious
79
implications of those revisions.
III. THE DISTRIBUTIVE MODEL
The modern face of the evolution debate represents a new step in
the historical development of evolution instruction policy. The “distributive model” for challenging the teaching of evolution is related
to the “strengths and weaknesses” strategy insofar as it is a facially

78

79

design instruction); Kelly S. Terry, Shifting out of Neutral: Intelligent Design and the Road to
Nonpreferentialism, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 67, 67 (2008) (suggesting the emergence of the
nonpreferentialist doctrine in Establishment Clause cases involving evolution instruction); Anita Y. Woudenberg, Propagating A Lemon: How the Supreme Court Establishes Religion in the Name of Neutrality, 7 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 307, 308–09 (2009) (suggesting
that the Establishment Clause should be narrowed in a number of cases, including some
cases involving evolution instruction, and that the Free Speech Clause is better suited to
resolve those cases). Even the rare example of commentary that does not focus on evolution instruction’s implications under the First Amendment tends not to consider alternative legal issues. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Freedom to Err: The Idea of Natural Selection in
Politics, Schools, and Courts, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 2 (2008) (offering a legislative
solution to the evolution debate). For reasons discussed below, it is the thesis of this Article that recent developments in antievolutionist policy-making counsels review from a
broader perspective that includes questions of religious establishment, but that also allows for a wider array of legal and political issues to be explored in connection with these
policies.
See A Setback for Science Education in Texas, NAT’L CTR. SCI. EDUC., (Apr. 1, 2009),
http://ncseweb.org/news/2009/04/setback-science-education-texas-004710 (noting that,
in passing the new state science standards in Texas, “creationists on the board were unsuccessful in inserting the controversial ‘strengths and weaknesses’ language from the old
set of standards”); Darwin’s in the Details, supra note 1 (statement of Bob Garfield) (as saying “[t]he Texas Board of Education voted to do away with the ‘strengths and weaknesses’
clause”). In general, controversial revisions to state science standards come under close
political scrutiny (and often reversal) before a legal challenge takes place. See, e.g., Evolution Debate in Kansas (12/4/06), supra note 6 (noting that as of 2006, “[t]he science standards for public schools in Kansas have been rewritten five times in the past eight years”).
See, e.g., Darwin’s in the Details, supra note 1 (statement of Eugenie Scott) (“[The new Texas standards] give[] a creationist teacher an opportunity to say, well, you know, perhaps
you should just read Genesis. So it’s creationism by the back door.”); id. (statement of
Casey Luskin) (“[T]eaching evolution in [a] manner that [in accordance with Texas’ new
standards] allows students to ask hard questions and really investigate and analyze the issues is the best way to teach science.”); Texas Improves on Strengths and Weaknesses Language
in Science Standards on Teaching Evolution, supra note 74 (“Under [Texas’] new standards,
students will be expected to analyze and evaluate the scientific evidence for evolution, not
religion.”); Slack, Texas on Evolution, supra note 75 (“Each of the amendments [to the
Texas science standards] singles out an old creationist argument, strips it of its overtly
ideological language, and requires teachers and textbook publishers to adopt it.”).
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neutral policy focused on the development of state science standards
that encourage educators to promote critical thinking about scientific
theories, including evolution. Unlike prior antievolutionist policy,
however, the distributive model seeks to shift virtually all responsibility for deciding how to address the evolution “controversy” to individ80
ual teachers in individual classrooms. By empowering educators to
determine how best to approach the evolution debate on a case-bycase basis, the distributive model represents a departure from not on81
ly the strengths and weaknesses strategy, but from every previous attempt to challenge evolution instruction. It is most often manifest in
82
“academic freedom bills,” which have been proposed in several
83
states and closely resemble the Discovery Institute’s Model Academic
84
Freedom Statute on Evolution. Academic freedom bills create a plat80

81
82

83

84

The distributive model’s transfer of ultimate authority over how to teach evolution to individual educators, and not to a government agency like a school board, is significant for
two reasons. First, it is an important departure from earlier evolution instruction policies,
which relied on policy makers like legislatures or school boards. Second, it is critical to
antievolutionists’ policy objectives for advancing the distributive model. If the distributive model only permitted school boards to make specific decisions about how teachers in
a particular jurisdiction should teach evolution, those decisions would too closely resemble the type of prospective statements about evolution instruction that have already been
found unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause. See, e.g., Kitzmiller v. Dover Area
Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707 (M.D. Pa. 2005) (striking down a school board’s efforts to
require that an anti-evolution disclaimer be read to students in science class). Although
perhaps not as effective a tool for combating evolution instruction, the distributive model’s delegation of policy-making authority to individual teachers represents a distinct advantage over broader policies promulgated by school boards because it permits prospective statements about evolution instruction to remain sufficiently general to avoid
constitutional challenge. For further discussion of the difficulties in applying the Establishment Clause to the distributive model, see infra Part IV.C.
See discussion infra note 105 (explaining the significant differences between the strengths
and weaknesses strategy and the distributive model).
See Bhattacharjee, supra note 5, at 1250 (describing the current evolution instruction debate by stating that “[b]esides periodic assaults on science standards as we recently saw in
Texas, we are concerned about antievolution legislation in different states under the
guise of academic freedom bills”).
See id. (“Just in the last few weeks, antievolution bills awaiting decisions in a number of
states—Oklahoma, South Carolina, Alabama—died in committee.”); Rosenau, supra note
5, at 1 (“In the last two years alone, 18 bills [similar to academic freedom bills] in 10
states have targeted the teaching of evolution.”); see also “Academic Freedom” Bills by State &
Year, NAT’L CTR. SCI. EDUC. (Mar. 20, 2009), http://ncse.com/creationism/general/
academic-freedom-bills-by-state-year (listing academic freedom bills by state and year).
Perhaps the most well-known and influential challenger of evolution instruction is the
Discovery Institute’s Center for Science and Culture. The Discovery Institute is an organization that, in its own words, “discovers and promotes ideas in the common sense tradition of representative government, the free market and individual liberty.” About Discovery: Mission Statement, DISCOVERY INST., http://www.discovery.org/about.php (last visited
Oct. 9, 2010). The Institute’s Center for Science and Culture describes itself as a program designed to “support[] research by scientists and other scholars” into alternatives to
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form for governments that want to limit, or present alternatives to,
the teaching of evolution to respond to judicial rejection of evolution
disclaimers and intelligent design without running afoul of the Estab85
lishment Clause. The bills do this by stepping back somewhat from
the policy debate and making broader, more general statements
about the integrity of science—including evolution—instruction.
These statements refer to endorsing academic treatment of “the full
range of scientific views regarding biological and chemical evolu86
tion,” but avoid any specific prescription regarding evolution in87
struction.
Instead they are permissive, encouraging educators to
engage student inquiries about the controversy surrounding evolution, but refraining from mandating whether or how they should go
88
about doing so.
89
Louisiana and Texas have adopted this new approach. In June
of 2008, Louisiana passed an academic freedom bill called the “Louisiana Science Education Act,” which requires the State Board of Secondary and Elementary Education to “allow and assist teachers” to
help
students
think
critically
about
“scientific
theo-

85

86
87

88

89

Darwinian evolution and to “encourage[] schools to improve science education” by
teaching students about the “scientific weaknesses” of evolutionary theory. See DISCOVERY
INST. CTR. SCI. & CULTURE, supra note 58. The Institute’s Model Academic Freedom Statute on
Evolution was published on September 7, 2007 and frames the discussion in terms of
teacher and student rights. See DISCOVERY INST., MODEL ACADEMIC FREEDOM STATUTE ON
EVOLUTION (2007), http://www.academicfreedompetition.com/freedom.php. It expressly protects the rights of teachers to “present scientific information pertaining to the
full range of scientific views regarding biological and chemical evolution,” and of students
to “subscribe to a particular position on any views regarding biological or chemical evolution.” Id. §§ 3, 5. It also states specifically that it is not to be “construed as requiring or
encouraging any change in the state curriculum standards,” or as “promoting any religious doctrine.” Id. at §§ 6, 7.
See Bhattacharjee, supra note 5, at 1250–51 (describing academic freedom bills as constituting “closet creationism being introduced through wording not obvious to those unfamiliar with the history of the controversy. . . . ID [Intelligent Design] proponents have repackaged ID and are promoting it as ‘evidence against evolution’”).
MODEL ACADEMIC FREEDOM STATUTE ON EVOLUTION, supra note 84, § 3.
Id. (providing that teachers in elementary and secondary schools “shall have the affirmative right and freedom to present scientific information pertaining to the full range of
scientific views regarding biological and chemical evolution”).
See H.B. 397 § 1, Gen. Assem., 10th Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2010), available at http://
www.lrc.ky.gov/record/10RS/HB397.htm (stating that “[t]eachers, principals, and other
school administrators are encouraged to create and foster an environment within public
elementary and secondary schools that promotes critical thinking skills, logical analysis,
and open and objective discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of scientific theories being studied [including evolution]”).
See Louisiana Science Education Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:285.1.B(1) (2008). The
full text of Texas’ revised state science standards is published in Chapter 112 of Title 19
of the Texas Administrative Code.
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ries . . . including . . . evolution, the origins of life, global warming,
90
and human cloning.” The Act defines the assistance available to
educators as “support and guidance for teachers regarding effective
ways to help students . . . critique . . . scientific theories . . . including
91
[evolution],” and expressly permits teachers, in addition to presenting the material in the standard textbook provided by the state board,
to “use supplemental textbooks and other instructional materials to
92
help students . . . critique . . . scientific theories.” The Act further
states that it “shall not be construed to promote any religious doc93
trine,” and calls for the promulgation of “rules and regulations ne94
cessary to implement” it. As with other academic freedom statutes,
however, Louisiana’s Act does not require educators to introduce any
critiques of the material in the standard science textbooks, nor does
it prescribe how educators who choose to take this approach should
go about promoting such critical scientific thinking in the class95
room. The controversy surrounding the Act has been strong. Despite the fact that it refers to theories other than evolution, critics of
the Act have, consistent with the doctrinal history of the evolution in96
struction debate, focused almost exclusively on their perception that
the Act functions as an invitation to teach creationism and other reli97
giously-based explanations of human origins in science classes. The
90
91
92
93
94

95

96
97

Louisiana Science Education Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:285.1.B(1) (2008).
Id. § 17:285.1.B(2).
Id. § 17:285.1.C.
Id. § 17:285.1.D.
Id. § 17:285.1.E. A rule was published in the Louisiana Register on August 20, 2009, and,
with the exception of some more explicit procedures for challenging an educator’s decision to utilize supplemental materials in the teaching of evolution, the language of the
proposed rule echoes that of the Act. See Bulletin 741-Louisiana Handbook for School
Administrators, Curriculum and Instruction, Science Education, 35:8 La. Reg. 1476 (Aug.
20, 2009).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:285.1.B(1), (2) (stating that the State Board of Education “shall
allow and assist teachers . . . to create and foster an environment . . . that promotes critical
thinking . . . of scientific theories,” including offering “support and guidance” for those
efforts) (emphasis added).
See supra Part II (discussing the doctrinal history of the evolution instruction debate).
Editorial, Louisiana’s Latest Assault on Darwin, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2008, at A18 (“The
state, after all, has a sorry history as a hotbed of creationists’ efforts to inject religious
views into science courses. All that stands in the way of this retrograde step [via the Louisiana Science Education Act] is Gov. Bobby Jindal.”); Letter from Alan I. Leshner, Chief
Exec. Officer, Am. Assoc. for the Advancement of Sci., to The Honorable Bobby Jindal,
Governor
of
La.
(June
20,
2008),
http://lasciencecoalition.org/docs/
AAAS_Jindal_veto_6.20.08.pdf (“[T]he Louisiana Science Education Act . . . appears designed to insert religious or unscientific views into science classrooms.”); Letter from Richard O’Grady, Ph.D., Exec. Dir., Am. Inst. of Biological Scis., to La. State Representatives
(June
9,
2008),
available
at
http://lasciencecoalition.org/docs/
AIBS_Oppose_SB_733_6.9.08.pdf (criticizing the Louisiana statute as promoting “super-
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Act’s supporters also focus their arguments on the question of religious establishment, but describe the Act as a religiously-neutral
move toward more intellectually honest and open-minded discussion
98
of controversial scientific topics like evolution in our public schools.
Similarly, in March of 2009, the State Board of Education in Tex99
100
as adopted a new set of science standards. The new standards seek
to “encourage critical thinking” about the sciences by “expect[ing]”
students to “analyze, evaluate, and critique scientific explanations . . . including examining all sides of scientific evidence of those
101
scientific explanations” relating to evolution. More specifically, under the new standards students are “expected” to “analyze and evaluate scientific explanations concerning any data of sudden appear102
ance, stasis, and sequential nature of groups in the fossil record,”
“analyze and evaluate scientific explanation concerning the complex103
ity of the cell,” and “evaluate the evidence concerning . . . current
theories of the evolution of the universe, including estimates for the
104
age of the universe.”
Texas’ new standards are analogous to the

98

99

100
101

102
103

104

natural” explanations of human origins in the classroom); Letter from Dena S. Sher,
State Legislative Council, Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, to La. State
Representatives (May 28, 2008), available at http://lasciencecoalition.org/docs/
AU_Oppose_SB_733_5.28.08.pdf (stating that the Louisiana Science Education Act
“would attempts [sic] to introduce religion into science classrooms’).
Memorandum from Paul G. Pastorek, La. State Dep’t of Educ., to City, Parish, and other
Local Sch. Superintendents et al. (Aug. 27, 2008) (defending the Louisiana Science Education Act as not “promot[ing] any religious doctrine”); John G. West, Louisiana Confounds the Science Thought Police, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (July 8, 2008),
http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=NjNjYTNjMTVkNmVhMmYxN2JkMWZhMzYzMG
NjNzY4ZDE (describing opposition to the Louisiana Science Education Act as a “disinformation campaign” based on “denouncing the bill as a nefarious plot to sneak religion
into the classroom”); John G. West, Questions and Answers About the Proposed Louisiana
Science Education Act, DISCOVERY INST. EVOLUTION NEWS & VIEWS (June 12, 2008),
http://www.evolutionnews.org/2008/06/questions_and_answers_about_th.html (stating
that the Louisiana Science Education Act would not “allow the teaching of creationism or
other religious beliefs”).
Texas is a particularly important participant in the evolution debate because it is the Nation’s largest purchaser of school textbooks and therefore a significant influence over the
content and direction of educational science texts. See Castro, supra note 73.
The full text of Texas’ revised state science standards is published in Chapter 112 of Title
19 of the Texas Administrative Code.
19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 112.34(c)(3)(A) (2009). The standards also seek to promote critical thinking about other politically controversial scientific issues such as global warming.
See id. § 112.37(c)(9)(H) (explaining that the student “is expected to . . . analyze and evaluate different views on the existence of global warming”).
Id. § 112.34(c)(7)(B).
Id. § 112.34(c)(7)(G). Sudden appearance, stasis, and cellular complexity are all concepts used in support of non-evolutionary theories of human origins. See Slack, Texas on
Evolution, supra note 75.
19 TEX ADMIN. CODE § 112.36(c)(4)(A) (2009).
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approach taken in academic freedom bills like Louisiana’s in that
they make clear to educators that they have the opportunity to introduce criticisms or alternative explanations of human origins, but they
105
do not go as far as mandating a method for doing so. Also, like the
Louisiana statute, opinions on both sides of the issue have been plentiful and passionate, and have focused almost exclusively on the question of whether the new standards will permit the introduction of re106
ligion into the classroom. Detractors have accused the standards of
intentionally creating opportunities for educators to introduce crea107
tionism in science class, while proponents laud the changes as
105

106

107

See, e.g., id. § 112.34(c)(7) (explaining that students are “expected to” think critically
about evolutionary concepts, but not specifying which materials or methods should be
used to promote such critical thinking). This feature of Texas’ new standards is not necessarily new in Texas. The “strengths and weaknesses” language from Texas’ prior standards could be read as a very similar strategic approach to Texas’ new standard emphasizing expectations of critical thought. Texas’ new language is nevertheless important to
this discussion for at least two reasons. First, the “strengths and weaknesses” language
failed to survive the regulatory process, indicating that the new standards are better reflective of the current movement to challenge traditional evolution instruction. Rather
than expressly directing educators to introduce weaknesses of evolutionary theory, the
new standards are potentially broader, in that they could be read to permit educators to
decide the best way to help students think critically about evolution without necessarily
focusing on specific weaknesses of evolution itself. For one instructor this may be to remind students of the definition of a scientific theory as potentially refutable. See, e.g.,
Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 735 (M.D. Pa. 2005) (citing expert testimony describing the scientific method as a “self-imposed convention of science,
which limits inquiry to testable, natural explanations about the natural world . . . [and it]
is a ‘ground rule’ of science today which requires scientists to seek explanations in the
world around us based upon what we can observe, test, replicate, and verify”). For another, it may mean introducing competing ideas about human origins—like creationism—
into a science class. By removing the word “weaknesses,” which seems to mandate a direct
challenge to evolution on its own terms, and replacing it with language about critical
analysis, Texas’ new standards represent precisely the same approach to the evolution instruction issue as academic freedom bills like the Louisiana Science Education Act, LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:285.1 (2008). Second, and on a related note, Texas adopted its new
standards in an environment in which academic freedom bills are the most popular policy measure for opponents of evolution instruction. See Rosenau, supra note 5, at 1 (“In
the last two years alone, 18 bills in 10 states have targeted the teaching of evolution.
These bills . . . authorize teachers to omit evolution or include creationism at their
whim.”). This political environment is relevant in interpreting Texas’ regulatory approach and counsels in favor of reading Texas’ new standards as philosophically consistent with academic freedom bills.
See, e.g., NAT’L CTR. FOR SCI. EDUC., A SETBACK FOR SCIENCE EDUCATION IN TEXAS (Apr. 1,
2009) (pointing to “creationists” on the board of education who sought to use the new
science standards to “encourage[] the presentation of creationist claims”); Slack, Texas on
Evolution, supra note 75 (describing the debate over new science standards in Texas as
one between “scientists and creationists”).
See Darwin’s in the Details, supra note 1 (statement of Eugenie Scott) (explaining that Texas’ new policy permits individual teachers to respond to student inquiries about evolution
by saying “perhaps you should just read Genesis”); see also id. (statement of Christine Cas-
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“progressive” and “a significant victory for scientists and educators in
108
favor of teaching the scientific evidence for and against evolution.”
These examples of the current approach to combating evolution
instruction are most interesting not for their specific language, but
for their broader commonalities, which corroborate the emerging
trend in the debate over teaching evolution. Louisiana and Texas’
enactments, along with the Model Academic Freedom Statute on Evolution
and many other academic freedom bills that are pending or that
109
failed in their respective states, represent a movement away from
sweeping legislative prescriptions for evolution instruction and toward a more diffuse policy approach that shifts decision making
about the intricacies of teaching evolution from legislatures and regu110
lators to individual educators.
Previous methods of challenging
evolution instruction involved generally applicable mandates in the
form of prohibitions, requirements of balanced treatment, or mandatory disclaimers, and were all found invalid under the Establishment
111
Clause. Recent enactments, by contrast, seek to avoid this problem

108
109

110

111

tillo Comer, the former Director of Science for the Texas Education Agency, stating that
Texas’ new science standards may bind teachers “to just have to teach any kind of pseudoscience” in response to student inquiries about evolution).
Texas Improves on Strengths and Weaknesses Language in Science Standards on Teaching Evolution, supra note 74.
In addition to successful measures in Louisiana and Texas, evolution opponents introduced similar measures in at least ten other States that were legislatively defeated. See,
e.g., “Academic Freedom” Bills by State & Year, supra note 83 (reporting on the defeat of academic freedom bills in Alabama, Florida, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri,
New Mexico, Oklahoma, and South Carolina as of June 6, 2010).
This is confirmed by the enacted regulation implementing the Louisiana Science Education Act, 35:8 La. Reg. 1476 (Aug. 20, 2009). The rule, like the Act under which it was
promulgated, states that the Board of Elementary and Secondary Education “shall, upon
request . . . allow and assist teachers and school administrators to create and foster an environment that promotes critical thinking skills, logical analysis, and open and objective
discussion of concepts, laws, principles, and scientific theories.” Id. It says nothing more
about how educators are to go about encouraging students to be critical about scientific
theories, nor does it go as far as the Act in specifying which theories are of particular
concern.
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 80-1627, 80-1628 (1960) (prohibiting public schools from
teaching “the theory or doctrine that mankind ascended or descended from a lower order of animals”); Louisiana Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and EvolutionScience in Public School Instruction Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:286.1–17:286.7 (1982)
(forbidding evolution instruction in public school unless accompanied by instruction in
creationism); Selman v. Cobb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 390 F. Supp. 2d 1286, 1286 (N.D. Ga.
2005) (invalidating a mandatory disclaimer placed inside every science textbook in the
district). There are also prior instances, like the “strengths and weaknesses strategy” employed in Texas’ former science standards, that do not require educators to engage in
conduct that challenges or dilutes evolution instruction, but rather create an environment wherein individual educators could choose to challenge evolutionary theory. To
the extent such policy measures existed before the distributive model, they have not been
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by relying on vague statements about the value of critical thinking
without taking any overt or official position as to how evolution
should be taught. Instead, responsibility is distributed to individual
educators to make that determination by acting as policy makers who
are empowered to decide for themselves how to best resolve the issue
112
on a case-by-case basis.
This “distributive model” for addressing questions of evolution instruction has profound implications for the future of the evolution
instruction debate and for the way in which policy measures based on
that model are evaluated under the law. As explained above, the evolution instruction debate has historically been doctrinally onedimensional; despite the dynamic nature of the policy measures impacting the debate—including the distributive model—these measures have all been evaluated solely in terms of their validity under the
113
Establishment Clause. Regardless of whether religion is in fact the
114
driving force behind the development of the distributive model, the
model’s political and legal ramifications are too broad to be treated
as a single constitutional issue or, for that matter, as solely a matter of
115
constitutional law.

112

113
114

115

challenged in the courts and nonetheless exhibit some distinct characteristics. For a full
discussion of the relevant differences between the “strengths and weaknesses strategy”
and the distributive model, see supra note 105.
See discussion supra note 80 (describing why the distributive model focuses policy-making
authority on the individual level, rather than at the agency level through school boards).
For example, if a science teacher is asked by a student whether evolution is a scientific
“fact,” the distributive model says little or nothing about how the teacher should respond.
The teacher could choose to do anything from pointing the student to the definition of a
scientific theory, to mentioning that a scientific controversy exists surrounding evolution,
to recommending alternative theories such as intelligent design, to suggesting that the
student ask their parents or pastor for advice or look to sources like the Book of Genesis
to explain human origins. Most, if not all, of these choices would fall within the range of
conduct permitted by the distributive model, but none is mandated by it.
See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra notes 97–98, 107–08 and accompanying text (outlining the debate
about whether academic freedom bills and Texas’ newly revised science standards implicate creationism).
A different approach would be to reconsider the scope of current Establishment Clause
doctrine to ensure that it can accommodate concerns that even facially neutral policies
like the distributive model are, at their core, merely attempts by lawmakers to facilitate
the presentation of religious theories of human origins in science classes. While this approach may certainly be worthwhile, and has been addressed in previous publications by
the author, see Louis J. Virelli III, Making Lemonade: A New Approach to Evaluating Evolution Disclaimers Under the Establishment Clause, 60 U. MIAMI L. REV. 423 (2006) [hereinafter
Virelli, Making Lemonade], it is not mutually exclusive with the animating position of this
Article, namely that the distributive model is better viewed in the broader context of
principles of administrative law.
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IV. THE DISTRIBUTIVE MODEL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A more comprehensive view of the distributive model, one that
incorporates the model’s political and legal complexities, is attainable only by stepping back from the traditional religious context for
viewing evolution instruction policy and considering all of the distributive model’s policy features. When treated in its entirety, the distributive model ceases to look like a one-dimensional legislative flirtation with religious establishment and begins to reveal itself for what it
is—a complex public policy measure that raises a wide variety of political and legal, including constitutional, issues. Closer examination
demonstrates that the most fruitful approach for addressing these issues is through application of principles associated with administrative law. This Article argues that a consideration of general principles
germane to administrative law will empower us to ask more and better questions about the distributive model than would reliance on the
Establishment Clause alone.
A. Administrative Law Principles
This new analytical approach to evolution instruction first requires an explanation of what is meant—for purposes of this discussion—by reference to “principles” of administrative law. Administrative law is the collection of political issues and legal doctrines
116
surrounding the formation and conduct of administrative agencies.
Without question, even under this definition, administrative law is
not exclusive of constitutional questions. The constitutional validity
of state action in the administrative context is no less subject to challenge—under the Establishment Clause, for instance—where the
government conduct at issue is an administrative regulation or a statute.

116

There is little made in this discussion of the sometimes significant differences between
federal and state administrative law. This is not due to a lack of recognition of those differences, but instead to the nature of the relevant inquiry. Although it is clear that the
distributive model is an artifact of state law, and thus will be more directly impacted by
state, as opposed to federal, administrative law, that distinction is rendered less important
by the higher-level claim made herein. As will be discussed further in Part V, infra, the
broad principles mentioned here are relevant to both federal and state administrative law
and, as such, make that otherwise significant distinction less important to the instant
analysis. To the extent later discussions of, for example, political legitimacy in the administrative context rely on the federal system as a reference, that is in the interest of simplicity and is neither meant to imply, nor does it in actuality represent, a relevant substantive
difference between federal and state law in that area.
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It does not follow, however, that administrative law is not in some
ways unique, and indeed it is. Administrative law implicates questions
of political legitimacy that are far less common in cases where power
117
is exercised by a constitutionally-created branch of government.
The powers of those branches are viewed as legitimate because they
118
The authority of
are expressly enumerated in the Constitution.
agency action, by contrast, is far less clear as a matter of constitutional
text and is more difficult to reconcile with accepted tenets of demo-

117

118

See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 462 (2003) [hereinafter Bressman, Beyond Accountability] (“From the birth of the administrative state, we have struggled to describe our regulatory government as the legitimate child of a constitutional democracy. That is, we have
sought to reconcile the administrative state with a constitutional structure that reserves
important policy decisions for elected officials and not for appointed bureaucrats.”); Gary
Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1231 (1994)
(“The post-New Deal administrative state is unconstitutional, and its validation by the legal system amounts to nothing less than a bloodless constitutional revolution. . . . Faced
with a choice between the administrative state and the Constitution, the architects of our
modern government chose the administrative state, and their choice has stuck.” (citation
omitted)).
See U.S. CONST. art. I–III; THOMAS C. MARKS, JR. & JOHN F. COOPER, STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL 190 (2d ed. 2003) (“[A]ll state governments are
composed of three branches . . . .”). This is not to say that there are never questions regarding whether the conduct of one of the three constitutionally-created branches of
government is politically legitimate; some of the more interesting and complex issues in
constitutional law involve questions about the scope and propriety of constitutionallyallotted government power. For example, questions about the extent of executive power
during wartime and of judicial “policymaking” from the bench are common in current
political discourse. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2240 (2008) (discussing
the extent of presidential power to hold suspected terrorists during wartime); Jeffrey Rosen, What’s Wrong with Judges Legislating from the Bench?, TIME, July 16, 2009,
http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1910714,00.html (“It’s too bad that
neither [then-Judge] Sotomayor nor any of the Senators felt at liberty to say [during her
Supreme Court confirmation hearing] what many scholars and court observers believe to
be true: Justices often legislate from the bench, and sometimes that’s a good thing.”).
The frequency and import of those questions to the functioning of tripartite government,
however, is not as profound as in the administrative context. If questions about the political legitimacy of congressional or judicial action are not answered definitively by the text
of the Constitution, they are nonetheless rarely if ever invoked to seriously question the
democratic validity of the entire institution. By contrast, the political (i.e., democratic)
legitimacy of the administrative state is a question that has persisted throughout our administrative history, and that is alive and well today in academic commentary about administrative law, see Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Governed: Against Simple Rules for a
Complex World, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 987, 987 (1997) (“Like an intriguing but awkward
family heirloom, the legitimacy problem is handed down from generation to generation
of administrative law scholars.”), as well as in law school curricula on the subject. See
MICHAEL ASIMOW & RONALD M. LEVIN, STATE AND FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 10 (3d
ed. 2009) (“Federal and state constitutions do not usually mention administrative agencies and agency heads are not elected . . . . As a result, many people question whether the
exercise of . . . power by agencies is legitimate.”).
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119

cratic government. As a result, the legitimacy of the administrative
state has been a source of frequent and contentious debate since its
120
inception. Arguments about the value of expert and independent
regulators tackling highly complex and technical problems of modern government have been countered by concerns over ossification
121
and agency capture, and a complex doctrine of judicial review has
developed to counter-balance the wide discretion granted to un122
elected administrators. As the size and authority of modern administrative government expands, these issues have only grown in signi123
ficance.
Moreover, administrative law contemplates the blending of traditionally separate government functions into a single legal entity in a
way that is otherwise alien to our democratic government. Constitu-

119

120
121

122

123

See Lawson, supra note 117, at 1231; see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Disciplining Delegation
After Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 452, 485 (2002) [hereinafter Bressman, Disciplining Delegation] (“[Administrative law principles] require agencies in general to articulate a basis for their policy determinations and, in particular, to
articulate the standards for those determinations.”); Cary Coglianese & Gary E. Marchant,
Shifting Sands: The Limits of Science in Setting Risk Standards, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1255, 1256
(2004) (“Administrative law aspires to bring reason to agency policymaking.”). The same
legitimacy issues exist in the context of state administrative law. See ASIMOW & LEVIN, supra note 118, at 10.
See Bressman, Beyond Accountability, supra note 117, at 462.
See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41
DUKE L.J. 1385, 1403–07 (1992) (discussing ossification in the rulemaking process);
Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039,
1059-67, 1060 (1997) (describing the significance of agency capture, the theory that “the
agency often becomes closely identified with and dependent upon the industry it is
charged with regulating” in the development of administrative law).
See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006) (outlining the various standards of judicial review for
“agency action[s], findings, and conclusions”); FINAL REPORT OF THE ATT’Y GEN.’S COMM.
ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE 91 (1941) (explaining that the depth of judicial review depends
on “[t]he character of the administrative agency, the nature of the problems with which it
deals, the nature and consequences of the administrative action, the confidence which
the agency has won, the degree to which the review would interfere with the agency’s
functions or burden the courts, the nature of the proceedings before the administrative
agency, and similar factors”); LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE
ACTION 320 (1965) (“The availability of judicial review is the necessary condition . . . of a
system of administrative power which purports to be legitimate, or legally valid.”).
See Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1998) (“The sheer power wielded by the administrative
state . . . immediately raises questions about its efficacy and even its political legitimacy.”);
Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV.
1511, 1512 (1992) (“Over the past century, the powers and responsibilities of administrative agencies have grown to an extent that calls into question the constitutional legitimacy
of the modern federal bureaucracy.”); see also Matt Welch & Nick Gillespie, Op-Ed.,
What’s Next Mr. President—Cardigans?, WASH. POST, July 19, 2009, at B09 (describing the
federal government’s bailout of the auto industry as “illegal”).
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124

tional law often compartmentalizes government functions of making, executing, and applying the law as a means of maintaining the
125
This approach is not, however, a
integrity of our political system.
126
foundational feature of the administrative state.
Individual agencies are often microcosms of the tripartite government structure designed in the Constitution: a single legal entity (often with a single
final decision maker) acts in a legislative (rulemaking), executive (in127
vestigation, enforcement) and judicial (adjudicative) capacity.
In
124

125

126

127

Constitutional law is used here as the foil for administrative law principles for the simple
reason that the features of administrative law that are of most interest to this project are
most closely analogous to issues commonly addressed in constitutional law, such as the
source, formation, and power of government.
Taken literally, this statement is not uncontroversial. Although state law tends toward a
more rigid definition of separation, see MARKS & COOPER, supra note 118, at 189 (explaining that state constitutions “allocate the state’s inherent power to [the] legislature, executive, and judiciary,” and that unlike the federal constitution, “most state constitutions also
contain a specific mandate providing for the separation of powers”), the question with
regard to the federal government is far less clear. Much has been said about whether the
separation of powers at the federal level should be understood formalistically to prohibit
one branch of government from intruding on the prerogatives of another (for example
whether the judicial branch can “legislate” from the bench), see Peter L. Strauss, The Place
of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573,
577 (1984) [hereinafter Strauss, The Place of Agencies] (explaining the formalist approach
to tripartite government as “suppos[ing] that what government does can be characterized
in terms of the kind of act performed—legislating, enforcing, and determining the particular application of law—and that for the safety of the citizenry from tyrannous government these three functions must be kept in distinct places”), or whether a more functionalist approach should be employed, whereby the three constitutional branches
interact so as to maximize their ability to provide checks and balances against one or
more branches’ attempts to unduly usurp the rightful authority of another branch. See id.
at 578 (describing the functionalist argument for separation of powers as seeking to “protect the citizens from . . . tyrannical government by establishing multiple heads of authority in government, which are then pitted one against another in a continuous struggle;
the intent of that struggle is to deny to any one (or two) of them the capacity ever to consolidate all governmental authority in itself”). The resolution of this debate, however, is
not necessary to the present analysis. Regardless of how distinct the spheres of constitutional power among the three coordinate branches, the separation of powers at minimum
“stresses the distinctness of the branches . . . in relation to their ‘core functions.’” Edward
Susolik, Note, Separation of Powers and Liberty: The Appointments Clause, Morrison v. Olson,
and Rule of Law, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1515, 1528 (1990) (quoting Peter L. Strauss, The Place
of Agencies in Government, supra at 578).
See Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions—A
Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 495 (1987) [hereinafter Strauss, Formal and
Functional Approaches] (“[T]he years since the Marbury decision have seen the emergence
of administrative discretion exercised by agencies in all the characteristic forms of governmental action—legislative, executive, and judicial.”); see also William J. Pohlman,
Comment, The Continued Viability of Ohio’s Procedure for Legislative Review of Agency Rules in
the Post-Chadha Era, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 251, 251 (1988) (“[A]dministrative agencies may
have authority to exercise legislative functions, judicial functions, or both.”).
See THE PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON ADMIN. MGMT., REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE WITH STUDIES
OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 39, 40 (1937) (describ-
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the context of administrative programs, this means that a program
designed and administered by an agency could implicate legal issues
that are unique to administrative law.
Delegation is among the most prominent of these issues. Delegation is the process whereby a constitutionally-mandated governmental
entity acts within its authority to empower another entity to perform a
128
function normally reserved to the former.
Although it centers on
constitutional concerns about the separation of powers, delegation is
generally not a prominent issue outside of the administrative law context because delegation between the three constitutionally-mandated
129
branches of government —at least with regard to the “core func130
The legislature
tions” of those branches—is largely prohibited.
cannot, for example, empower itself to execute its own laws, nor can
131
it empower the President to craft and enact legislation. Delegation
is, however, a fundamental and (somewhat) controversial issue in
132
administrative law that asks whether legislators or rule makers act

128

129

130
131

132

ing administrative agencies as “miniature independent governments”); see also Strauss,
Formal and Functional Approaches, supra note 126, at 492–93 (“[A]gencies adopt rules having the shape and impact of statutes, mold governmental policy through enforcement
decisions and other initiatives, and decide cases in ways that determine the rights of private parties.”).
See, e.g., Peter H. Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn, & Glen O. Robinson, A Theory of Legislative
Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1982) (“The delegation doctrine also has a theoretical application to the transfer of any government power. The transfer of judicial power
to executive agencies, of executive power to the legislature, or of legislative power to the
executive provide examples of this application.” (citations omitted)).
For purposes of this discussion, the three constitutionally-mandated branches (legislative,
executive, and judicial) are treated as distinct from the oft-described “fourth branch” of
administrative agencies. THE PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON ADMIN. MGMT., supra note 127, at
39–40.
Susolik, supra note 125, at 1528 (quoting Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government, supra note 125, at 578).
See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (holding the Line Item Veto Act
unconstitutional on the grounds that it violated the Presentment Clause); Bowsher v.
Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (holding that the powers granted to the Comptroller General
under the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act violated the Constitution’s command that Congress play no direct role in the execution of the laws).
Courts have acknowledged the differences between delegation at the legislative and regulatory levels, noting that delegation by agency regulators to another component of that
agency is better understood through administrative, rather than purely constitutional,
law:
Judge Williams [in Whitman v. American Trucking Associations] seemed to acknowledge that the application of the nondelegation doctrine to invalidate a regulation
and remand it to the agency was unconventional. However, he stated, the Supreme Court no longer insists on the “strong” form of nondelegation review that
requires invalidation of standardless statutes. Rather, he explained, the Supreme
Court only demands an intelligible principle to set limits on the exercise of administrative discretion and facilitate judicial review. Although Congress ordinarily
supplies the requisite principle, Judge Williams commented, the agency, in the
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within their constitutional authority when they bestow policy-making
133
Delegation incorporates basic
power on administrative agencies.
questions about the legitimacy of administrative government and the
134
role of separation of powers in our democracy.
In short, the choice to apply principles of administrative law in
evaluating a policy decision reveals questions that are simply beyond
the scope of the Establishment Clause analyses that have heretofore
dominated the evolution instruction debate. Because issues of political legitimacy, governmental multitasking, and delegation of policy
making authority all fit more comfortably into an administrative law
paradigm, any policy review that includes one or more of these issues
should be approached with administrative law principles in mind.
B. Administrative Features of the Distributive Model
The distributive model has a number of administrative features.
First, of course, is the technical matter that the model can be prom-

133

134

exercise of its expert judgment, instead could limit its own discretion. This approach, he later observed, fits better with modern doctrines of deference to administrative decisions applied in cases like Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.
Bressman, Disciplining Delegation, supra note 119, at 456–57 (citations omitted). For an
example of intra-agency delegation, see the recently revised Texas state science standards,
the full text of which is published in Chapter 112 of the Texas Administrative Code.
For purposes of this discussion, delegation is meant in the broadest sense to include delegation of both legislative and judicial authority to agencies. See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm’n
v. S. C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 773 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The Court
long ago laid to rest any constitutional doubts about whether the Constitution permitted
Congress to delegate rulemaking and adjudicative powers to agencies. That, in part, is
because the Court established certain safeguards surrounding the exercise of these powers.” (citations omitted)). The distinction between these two types of delegation will be
explored more fully in Part V.B.2, infra.
See Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 332 (2002) (“The
delegation phenomenon raises fundamental questions about democracy, accountability,
and the enterprise of American governance.”). Compare DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER
WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 39
(1993) (citing developments that restricted delegation) and Lawson, supra note 117, at
1249 (“[T]he most fundamental constitutional problems with modern administrative governance—unlimited federal power, rampant delegations of legislative authority, and the
combination of functions in administrators—are not even remotely close cases.”), with
JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE
PUBLIC LAW 134 (1997) (“Since . . . [A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495 (1935)] the Supreme Court has not invalidated a single statute on the basis of
excessive delegation. This result—surprising, of course, given the history of the doctrine—cannot be explained be explained by improvement since 1935 in the drafting of
statutes.”) and Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 55 (1994) (claiming that, under an originalist interpretation of the
Constitution, “Congress has wide discretion to vest . . . [administrative powers] in officers
operating under or beyond the plenary power of the President”).
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ulgated by administrative agencies, typically at the state and local lev135
el. This in and of itself is not a significant departure from previous
evolution policies, nor is it necessarily the case; there is nothing inherent in the distributive model that precludes it from being part of a
statutory mandate, and in fact many of the policy measures incorpo136
rating the model are statutes. At best, then, the fact that it could be
the work of an administrative agency is instructive, but far from dispositive, in helping to comprehend why the distributive model is best
understood through application of administrative law principles.
Another basis for thinking about the distributive model in admin137
istrative terms is its grounding in scientific conflict. While it is a legislature’s prerogative to legislate on any topic within its constitutional
138
power, it is a founding principle of administrative law that agencies
staffed with experienced experts in a particular field are better
139
In
equipped to make complex, technical judgments in that field.
the case of evolution instruction and the distributive model in particular, there are overlapping areas of relevant expertise. Experience
and technical knowledge must be brought to bear in the fields of
education and science, with the latter requiring an understanding of
the current state of scientific opinion about the origins of human be140
ings on Earth. While this may not be entirely beyond the capacity
135
136

137
138
139

140

The full text of Texas’ revised state science standards is published in Chapter 112 of Title
19 of the Texas Administrative Code.
In fact, the Louisiana Science Education Act institutes the distributive model as a matter
of state statutory law. See Louisiana Science Education Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 17:285.1.B(1) (2008). Although it does call for regulations to be promulgated to implement the provisions of the Act, see Bulletin 741-Louisiana Handbook for School Administrators, Curriculum and Instruction, Science Education 35:8 La. Reg. 1476 (Aug. 20,
2009), Louisiana’s policy regime for evolution instruction is essentially a matter of state
statute.
One commentator described the new Texas science standards as “expanding the attacks
beyond evolution to include scientific expertise itself.” Rosenau, supra note 5, at 1.
See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 197 (1824) (“[T]he sovereignty of Congress,
though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those objects.”).
See JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 23 (1938) (“With the rise of regulation, the need for expertness became dominant . . . .”); Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation
in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1252 (1986) (“As in its initial phase, the
New Deal continued its propensity to address particularized areas of unrest through regulation by experts . . . .”); id. at 1266 (“With the final legitimation of the New Deal came
the acceptance of a central precept of public administration: faith in the ability of experts to develop effective solutions . . . .”). Recently, Professors Freeman and Vermeule
have noted the Supreme Court’s support for the importance of agency expertise. See Jody
Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007 SUP.
CT. REV. 51, 52 (2007) (noting “the Court majority’s [in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S.
497 (2007)] increasing worries about the politicization of administrative expertise”).
See supra notes 97–98, 107–08 and accompanying text (outlining the current debate over
the distributive model of evolution instruction, in which proponents of the distributive
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of legislators, it certainly appears better suited to administrative, ra141
ther than legislative, treatment.
Administrative law principles are also implicated by the distributive model’s decision-making regime. The distributive model is distinct from the evolution instruction policies that preceded it because
the distributive model does not provide educators with a widereaching mandate regarding how to approach questions of human
142
origins.
Instead, it states a series of principles about scientific examination and integrity in the classroom and shifts the ultimate decision of how to handle issues pertaining to the veracity or exclusivity of
143
evolutionary theory to educators on a local, individualized basis.
This is an important change from prior evolution instruction policy
and is perhaps the strongest support for treating the distributive
model as an administrative endeavor. The generalized mandates that
preceded the distributive model fit neatly into the legislative and/or
rulemaking paradigm; prohibitions on teaching evolution, balanced
treatment legislation, and evolution disclaimers were all generalized
144
prescriptions regarding evolution instruction.
The distributive model, by contrast, operates entirely differently.
It begins with a statutory or regulatory framework that transfers policy-making authority to individual educators, who are then expected

141

142
143
144

model contend that evolutionary theory is vulnerable to scientific critique, while its opponents argue that there is no legitimate scientific controversy regarding the veracity of
Darwinian evolution).
Professor DelFattore contends that as early as the “middle of the nineteenth century,”
scientific questions accompanying evolutionary theory had become too technically complex for nonscientists (including talented leaders and politicians like Wilberforce and
Gladstone) to debate on an even footing with scientists. DelFattore, supra note 18, at 32
(citing JAMES R. MOORE, THE POST-DARWINIAN CONTROVERSIES: A STUDY OF THE
PROTESTANT STRUGGLE TO COME TO TERMS WITH DARWIN IN GREAT BRITAIN AND AMERICA
1870-1900 213 (1979); GEORGE E. WEBB, THE EVOLUTION CONTROVERSY IN AMERICA 1, 64
(1994)).
See discussion supra Part III (describing the distributive model).
See discussion supra notes 87–88, 110–11 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 98 & n.3 (1968) (invalidating “Initiated Act
No. 1, Ark. Acts 1929; Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 80-1627, 80-1628 (1960 Repl. Vol.),” which prohibits “a teacher in any state-supported school or university ‘to teach the theory or doctrine that mankind ascended or descended from a lower order of animals,’ or ‘to adopt
or use in any such institution a textbook that teaches’ this theory”); see also Edwards v.
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 581 (1987) (invalidating the Louisiana Balanced Treatment for
Creation-Science and Evolution-Science in Public School Instruction Act, LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 17:286.1–17:286.7, which “forbids the teaching of the theory of evolution in public schools unless accompanied by instruction in ‘creation science’”); Kitzmiller v. Dover
Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 708 (M.D. Pa. 2005) (striking a requirement that
school officials read a statement to ninth grade science students that evolution is “not a
fact,” and that “[g]aps in the theory exist for which there is no evidence”).
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to apply generalized legislative or regulatory instructions to reach
more specific conclusions about how to educate their students about
evolution. This form of policy making displays a common feature of
administrative law: it empowers educators to operate on a continuum
between quasi-legislative (regulatory) and quasi-judicial (adjudicative) policy making that is generally not permitted in any of the three
145
constitutionally-mandated branches of government.
Put another
way, the distributive model is best understood by reference to administrative law doctrine because it implicates the fundamental relation146
ship in administrative law between rules and orders.
Although important to our understanding of administrative law,
the distinction between rulemaking and adjudication can be difficult
147
to identify in practice.
Rules are defined in federal and state administrative law as prospective, generally-applicable prescriptions that

145
146

147

See discussion supra note 131 and accompanying text.
See 5 U.S.C. § 551(4), (6) (2006) (originally enacted as Administrative Procedure Act of
1946, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237) (defining rules and orders under the federal Administrative
Procedure Act); MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT, 1981 ACT, § 1-102(5), (10)
(1990). Professor Fuchs recognized the importance of the distinction between rules and
orders at the outset of the administrative state:
Administrative rule-making is one type of function performed by administrative
agencies. The procedural problems attending the exercise of this function are to
some extent distinct from those which surround the performance of other administrative acts, such as decisions and orders addressed to particular individuals . . . . Rule-making, sometimes referred to as “administrative legislation,” and a
companion function, often called “administrative adjudication,” have become
primary categories in the study of administrative law.
Ralph F. Fuchs, Procedure in Administrative Rule-Making, 52 HARV. L. REV. 259, 259 (1938).
He went on to explain that:
The most obvious definition of rule-making . . . asserts simply that it is the function
of laying down general regulations as distinguished from orders that apply to
named persons or to specific situations. Most acts of legislatures . . . establish
rights and duties with respect either to people generally or to classes of people or
situations that are defined but not enumerated. Conversely, the judgments of
courts usually are addressed to particular individuals or to situations that are definitely specified. Similarly, administrative action can be classified into general regulations, including determinations whose effect is to bring general regulations into operation, and orders or acts of specific application.
Id. at 263 (citations omitted).
The characterization of administrative activity as rulemaking or adjudication has been a
source of consistent controversy among courts and commentators. See, e.g., JOHN
DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
19–20 (1927) (“The whole discussion [about the rule-order distinction] should go to
demonstrate the futility of trying to classify a particular exercise of administrative power
as either wholly legislative or wholly judicial. The tendency of the administrative procedure is to foreshorten both functions into a continuous governmental act.”); PETER L.
STRAUSS, TODD D. RAKOFF & CYNTHIA R. FARINA, GELLHORN & BYSE’S ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 248–251 (10th ed. 2003) (collecting materials “that bear on
the question of how the [rule-order] distinction is, as a general matter, to be drawn, and
on the difficulties in doing so”).

Nov. 2010]

JUDGING DARWIN

115

are developed in accordance with procedures designed to promote
148
public participation and transparency. Orders, by contrast, are the
product of adjudication, are dispositions “of particular applicability
determining the rights of specific parties on the basis of their special
149
circumstances,” and are understood as binding only those parties.
Depending on how it is put into action, the distributive model
represents a range of administrative activity that can at times be described as either rulemaking or adjudication. An examination of two
permissible yet very different approaches to implementing the distributive model demonstrates this point.
In the first approach, a teacher responds to a specific request
from a student asking her to address some part of the evolution debate by being critical of evolutionary theory. The teacher’s decision
in this example is ad hoc, retrospective, and designed to affect only a
particular group of people. It fits nicely within the definition of an
order and has the added benefit of satisfying our instinctive understanding of an adjudicative decision in that it is focused on a specific,
pre-existing conflict or inquiry.
The second approach, however, demonstrates the difficulty in
classifying the distributive model as purely regulatory or adjudicative.
In this approach, a teacher decides on her own initiative—without
encountering any inquiries or concerns from students about the veracity of evolutionary theory—to design a lesson plan highlighting
the “weaknesses” in evolutionary theory and to implement that lesson
plan in her science classes from that point on. On its face, her decision looks like a rule: it is prospective, applicable to all current and
future students, and is not aimed at an existing conflict. On the other hand, the decision could be said to fail as a rule, and thus be better
described as an order, for a number of reasons. Although it is technically prospective, the decision remains so primarily in the mind of
the individual instructor. She has no explicit authority under the
model to promulgate any lasting, formal changes to the curriculum,
in her classroom or otherwise, going forward. Her decision is also
generally applicable only in context; it affects only those students in
her classroom, and only while they are required to be in her class148

149

See ASIMOW & LEVIN, supra note 118, at 192–94; see also 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(4), 553 (defining a
“rule” and describing informal rulemaking procedures under the federal Administrative
Procedure Act); MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT § 1-102(5) (defining rules for use
in state administrative law systems).
See Arthur Earl Bonfield, State Administrative Policy Formulation and the Choice of Lawmaking
Methodology, 42 ADMIN. L. REV. 121, 122 (1990); see also ASIMOW & LEVIN, supra note 118, at
8 (discussing adjudication in state and federal administrative law); MODEL STATE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, 1981 ACT, §1-102(10) (1990) (defining orders).
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room. The characterization of the teacher’s decision as generally applicable thus depends on whether the decision’s impact is measured
in relation to the teacher’s own jurisdiction, her classroom, or a larger group of students in, for example, the school as a whole, the
school district, or the entire state. Moreover, although the process by
which the teacher arrived at her hypothetical decision was the product of a procedurally valid statute or regulation, it does not itself contain any of the procedural protections associated with even informal—let alone formal—rulemaking under the APA and similar state
150
statutes. In short, this second approach to implementing the distributive model leaves much room for debate as to whether a teacher’s
decision is better described as a rule or an order.
These two examples are not intended to resolve the question of
whether the distributive model represents a primarily regulatory or
adjudicative regime, but instead to demonstrate that, while the implementation of the distributive model may not represent a paradigmatic example of either adjudication or rulemaking in every instance,
the range of decision-making authority available to teachers under
the model at minimum reflects the multi-dimensional nature of policy making that is endemic to administrative law.
Still another relevant feature of the distributive model is its delegation of authority by legislators or regulators to individual educators
to act as local, relatively autonomous evolution instruction policy
151
makers.
The Discovery Institute’s Model Academic Freedom Statute
grants “every K-12 public school teacher . . . or instructor . . . the affirmative right and freedom to present scientific information pertaining to the full range of scientific views regarding biological and chem152
ical evolution,” but nowhere suggests how, or whether those rights
should be exercised. Similar language appears in the Louisiana and
153
Texas enactments, and confirms that the distributive model is a
delegation of decision making authority from the state legislature or
150

151

152
153

See 5 U.S.C. § 553, 556–57 (describing procedures for formal and informal rulemaking
under the federal APA); MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT § 3-101 et seq.
(describing rulemaking procedures).
See, e.g., Louisiana Science Education Act, LA, REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:285.1(B)(1) (2008)
(requiring only that the State Board “allow and assist” teachers to promote “critical thinking” about evolution in their classrooms).
MODEL ACADEMIC FREEDOM STATUTE ON EVOLUTION, supra note 84, § 3.
See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:285.1.B(2) (defining the assistance available to educators as
“support and guidance for teachers regarding effective ways to help students . . . critique . . . scientific theories . . . including [evolution]”); 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§ 112.34(c)(7) (2009) (explaining that students are “expected to” think critically about
evolutionary concepts, but not specifying which materials or methods should be used to
promote such critical thinking).
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education board to individual science teachers to determine how
specific issues regarding the teaching of evolution will be resolved in
154
specific instances. Where authority is delegated from one administrative entity to another, such as in Texas’ new standards, the case for
treating the issue in terms of its relationship with administrative law is
155
even more compelling.
C. The Distributive Model and the Establishment Clause
The argument for viewing the distributive model through the lens
of administrative law is not only based on the positive correlation between the two. It is also supported by the fact that the Establishment
Clause—the traditionally exclusive vehicle for judicial review of evolu156
tion instruction issues —is somewhat ill-equipped to perform that
function with respect to the distributive model. The standards used
by federal courts to analyze evolution instruction cases under the Establishment Clause depend upon identifying a religious purpose or
effect within the statute or policy measure under review. The Lemon
test, which is still the primary authority cited by courts in evolution
157
instruction cases, invalidates only those statutes with a solely secta158
rian purpose or a primary religious effect.
The legislative motiva154

155

156
157

158

Delegation in this case is used to refer broadly to delegation of legislative as well as judicial authority to administrative actors. Further discussion of delegation in the distributive
model is taken up in Part V.B.2, infra.
Professor Bressman noted that the appellate court thought as much in Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns:
Judge Williams [in Whitman] seemed to acknowledge that the application of the
nondelegation doctrine to invalidate a regulation and remand it to the agency was
unconventional. . . . Although Congress ordinarily supplies the requisite principle,
Judge Williams commented, the agency, in the exercise of its expert judgment, instead could limit its own discretion. This approach, he later observed, fits better
with modern doctrines of deference to administrative decisions . . . .
Bressman, Disciplining Delegation, supra note 119, at 456–57.
See discussion supra note 113 and accompanying text.
McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (declining to abandon the Lemon test
as the primary doctrinal framework in applying the Establishment Clause); see also Pager,
supra note 15, at 32 (describing the Lemon test as the “dominant framework for analyzing
school-religion interactions under the First Amendment”). But see id. at 890 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (describing the Lemon test as “discredited”).
See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (holding that in order to survive
Establishment Clause scrutiny, a statute must (1) have a secular purpose; (2) have a principle or primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) not foster excessive government entanglement with religion).
The excessive entanglement prong of the Lemon test is not discussed further here for
two reasons. First, it has been described by various members of the Court in recent opinions as being reduced to “an aspect of the inquiry into a statute’s effect,” Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233 (1997), and as being “recast . . . as simply one criterion relevant to
determining a statute’s effect.” Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 807–08 (2000) (Thomas,
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tion standard, which played a prominent role in balanced treatment
159
cases, depends upon a showing that lawmakers’ primary purpose
160
was to promote religion. The endorsement test was the courts’ preferred standard in more recent cases dealing with facially neutral evolution disclaimers and the intelligent design debate, and is thus the
standard most likely to be applied in reviewing the distributive mod161
el. It prohibits statutes that create the appearance, in the eyes of a
reasonable objective observer, of government endorsement of reli162
These standards are
gion or favoritism toward religious believers.

159

160

161

162

J., writing for plurality). By that account, discussion of the effects prong of Lemon is sufficient. Second, even if excessive institutional entanglement with religion were still treated
as dispositive under the Lemon test, the distributive model is too indeterminate to meet
this standard. Because it says nothing on its face about religion and does not require that
the state do anything with regard to evolution instruction, it is virtually impossible to depict the permissive language of the distributive model as entangling the state with anything, let alone doing so excessively and with respect to religion. Where unconstitutional
entanglements have been found, they have frequently been in cases where religious institutions received government funding and conditions on receipt of government funds or
compliance reviews associated with the granting of those funds resulted in intimate government involvement with a religious institution. See Stephen M. Feldman, Divided We
Fall: Religion, Politics, and the Lemon Entanglements Prong, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 253, 269
(2009) (“Even in those first years after Lemon . . . administrative entanglement quickly
assumed a position of prominence, as the justices focused on governmental surveillance
and control over religious schools in a variety of public funding scenarios.”). That is
simply not the case with the distributive model.
See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (invalidating Louisiana’s balanced
treatment statute); McLean v. Ark. Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982) (invalidating Arkansas’ balanced treatment statute).
See, e.g., Edwards, 482 U.S. at 587, 591–93 & nn.12–14 (citing in support of its decision to
invalidate Louisiana’s balanced treatment statute language in the legislative history indicating that the promotion of the biblical account of creationism was the motivating force
behind the act); McLean, 529 F. Supp. at 1261, 1263 (invalidating balanced treatment statute because the statute was found to be part of a “religious crusade . . . motivated by [an]
opposition to the theory of evolution and [a] desire to see [creationism] taught in the
public schools”).
Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 745 (M.D. Pa. 2005); Selman v.
Cobb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 390 F. Supp. 2d 1286 (N.D. Ga. 2005); see Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ., 975 F. Supp. 819 (E.D. La. 1997), aff’d, 185 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 1999),
reh’g denied, 201 F.3d 602 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ. v. Freiler,
530 U.S. 1251 (2000).
See, e.g., Selman, 390 F. Supp. 2d at 1305 (describing the endorsement test as prohibiting
any statement that, when viewed by a reasonable observer who is familiar with the statement’s historic and cultural context, conveys a message of government endorsement of
religion (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984))). But see Kristi L. Bowman, Seeing
Government Purpose Through the Objective Observer’s Eyes: The Evolution-Intelligent Design Debates, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 417, 461 (2006) (contending that the Supreme Court in
McCreary County conflated the purpose and effects test of Lemon and “adopted the perspective of the reasonable observer to evaluate not only whether a statute or policy has the
effect of creating an apparent endorsement of religion, but also whether that statute or
policy was motivated by an impermissible government purpose”).

Nov. 2010]

JUDGING DARWIN

119

not only substantively limited in their ability to deal with facially neu163
tral, indeterminate policies like the distributive model, but are unable to accommodate the breadth of political and constitutional issues
that the model implicates.
Antievolutionist policies have become increasingly secular in their
164
language and their stated purpose, and the distributive model is no
exception. In addition to remaining facially neutral with regard to
religion, the model incorporates a lesson from recent evolution disclaimer cases of limiting its stated purpose and legislative history to
165
discussions of scientific complexity and uncertainty. Despite being
supported by organizations that are veterans of antievolutionist poli166
tics and, in many cases, creationists, the distributive model does not
167
make any positive mention of religion and in fact is careful to explain that its only motivation is to promote scientific integrity, not the

163

164

165

166

167

In a previous article, I argued that Establishment Clause doctrine is consistently underinclusive, over-inclusive, or both in its treatment of facially neutral, indeterminate policies
like the distributive model. See Virelli, Making Lemonade, supra note 115.
See supra Parts II.B, III. This is in large part the result of a series of judicial decisions invalidating policy measures advocated by evolution opponents. See discussion supra Part II.A.
(describing the development of evolution instruction policy); see also Ravitch, supra note
12, at 852 (explaining that the Court’s decision in Epperson “led to the ‘creation science’
movement,” and “[a]s creationism begat creation science, creation science would soon
beget a much more powerful offspring, Intelligent Design”); id. at 896 (“The form that
the current [Intelligent Design] movement has taken is primarily a response to cases decided under the Establishment Clause.”).
See, e.g., MODEL ACADEMIC FREEDOM STATUTE ON EVOLUTION, supra note 84, § 7 (“Nothing in this act shall be construed as promoting any religious doctrine, promoting discrimination for or against a particular set of religious beliefs, or promoting discrimination for
or against religion or non-religion.”); Texas Improves on Strengths and Weaknesses Language
in Science Standards on Teaching Evolution, supra note 74 (“‘Texas now has the most progressive science standards on evolution in the entire nation . . . . Contrary to the claims
of the evolution lobby, absolutely nothing the Board did promotes “creationism” or religion in the classroom. Groups that assert otherwise are lying, plain and simple.’” (quoting Dr. John West, Senior Fellow at the Discovery Institute)); Memorandum from Paul G.
Pastorek, La. State Dep’t of Educ., to City, Parish, and other Local Sch. Superintendents
et al., supra note 98 (“The legislative intent is explicitly stated that [the Louisiana Science
Education Act] shall not be construed to promote any religious doctrine, promote discrimination for or against a particular set of religious beliefs, or promote discrimination
for or against religion or non-religion.”).
The model academic freedom bill is the work of the Discovery Institute’s Center for
Science and Culture. See MODEL ACADEMIC FREEDOM STATUTE ON EVOLUTION, supra note
84.
Indeed, the Model Statute explicitly states that “[n]othing in this act shall be construed as
promoting any religious doctrine, promoting discrimination for or against a particular set
of religious beliefs, or promoting discrimination for or against religion or non-religion.”
Id. § 7; see also Louisiana Science Education Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:285.1.D (2008)
(stating that the Act “shall not be construed to promote any religious doctrine”).
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advancement of any religious doctrine.
Independent of whether
the distributive model’s claim of religious neutrality is sincere, the reality for reviewing courts is that facially neutral statutes—in particular
those, like the distributive model, that are careful to maintain the appearance of neutrality not just in the final statutory or regulatory language but throughout all phases of the legislative process—present
greater complications under the Establishment Clause than facially
sectarian ones. As a result, the distributive model’s omission of religious language from not only the text of the enactment but from any
supporting discussion thereof helps distance the model from the
169
reach of existing Establishment Clause doctrine.
A far greater problem than the distributive model’s facial neutrality for reviewing courts under the Establishment Clause is the model’s
lack of determinacy. It is this lack of determinacy that represents the
distributive model’s greatest departure from previous antievolutionist
policies regarding evolution instruction, including the facially neutral
disclaimers in Selman and Kitzmiller. Unlike those disclaimers, which
mandated how certain statements about evolution were to be presented to students, the distributive model is premised on being permissive; it facilitates local educators’ ability to confront evolution
170
questions at their own (presumably antievolutionist) discretion.
This approach further removes the distributive model from the range
of analysis reasonably available under the Establishment Clause. Because the distributive model does not require a particular outcome in
the treatment of evolution questions, it becomes exceedingly difficult

168

169

170

Even the distributive model’s primary advocate, the Discovery Institute’s Center for
Science and Culture, has changed its publicly stated purpose for taking issue with evolution education. In 1999, the Discovery Institute’s Center for Science and Culture produced a document outlining a five-year strategy for combating evolution instruction in
which it described as its purpose “to reverse the stifling dominance of the materialist
worldview [including evolution theory], and to replace it with a science consonant with
Christian and theistic convictions.” See DISCOVERY INST., Wedge Strategy, supra note 58, at 2.
Ten years later, the same organization describes its mission as “encourag[ing] schools to
improve science education by teaching students more fully about the theory of evolution,
including the theory’s scientific weaknesses as well is its strengths.” DISCOVERY INST. CTR.
SCI. & CULTURE, supra note 58.
See Virelli, Making Lemonade, supra note 115 (arguing that modern Establishment Clause
doctrine cannot adequately accommodate facially neutral evolution instruction policies);
Charles Kitcher, Note, Lawful Design: A New Standard for Evaluating Establishment Clause
Challenges to School Science Curricula, 39 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 451, 492–93 (2006)
(contending that “the best hope of passing constitutional muster . . . would be a curriculum measure that did not go beyond requiring a critical presentation of evolution”).
See discussion supra note 80 and accompanying text (describing the importance to the
distributive model of decision making by individual educators, rather than agencies such
as school boards).
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to ascribe any particular purpose or consequence to it or its drafters,
let alone a religious one. It is likewise very hard to measure the model’s overall effect on the community when its application in the classroom remains uncertain. Facial Establishment Clause challenges to
the model will thus be difficult to sustain. Even as-applied challenges
to the distributive model are problematic under the Establishment
Clause, as the challenge of determining whether an individual educator introduced an alternative to evolution in the classroom for a religious or other purpose remains, at best, elusive. Unlike policy measures formulated on the record through a deliberative political
process, the decisions of individual educators will likely not be accompanied by documented comments or arguments supporting a
particular conclusion. Absent an admission by the educator that she
was religiously motivated, the only sources of information for a court
entertaining an as-applied Establishment Clause challenge to an educator’s decision under the distributive model will be circumstantial
171
evidence of motive, which is by definition difficult to decipher, or a
hypothetical exercise in deductive reasoning to determine what conclusions a reasonable observer would make as to the decision’s im172
pact on the community. Beyond the fact that determining the objective impact of a decision on an entire community relies on a
number of highly subjective factors such as defining the reasonable
173
observer and the depth of information attributable to that observer,
the use of as-applied challenges to the distributive model is significantly more costly and time-consuming than a single facial challenge,
making the Establishment Clause an even less attractive vehicle for
plaintiffs challenging the policy on an as-applied basis.

171
172

173

See, e.g., McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982) (applying
the legislative motivation standard to an issue of evolution instruction).
Selman v. Cobb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 390 F. Supp. 2d 1286, 1306 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (applying
the endorsement test to invalidate an evolution disclaimer because it conveyed the message that those who “oppose evolution for religious reasons . . . are favored members of
the political community”). There is also the unlikely possibility that a student or some
other witness will provide first-hand evidence of a teacher’s motivations, for instance via
taping (which would require a significant amount of foresight and planning on behalf of
the witness) or testifying to specific statements made by the instructor that betray their
reasons for introducing information critical of evolution in the classroom. Although
perhaps more likely than a confession, the probability that a religiously motivated teacher
would admit as much in the classroom is too small to render an Establishment Clause
challenge an effective way to address potentially problematic policy decisions by individual educators.
See Schuneman, supra note 6, at 215–16 (noting inherent weaknesses of the endorsement
test in dealing with evolution instruction issues); Virelli, Making Lemonade, supra note
115, at 443 & n.99 (outlining “the weaknesses in the endorsement test”).
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This is not to say that the Establishment Clause or, more specifically, the endorsement test is rendered obsolete or otherwise inapposite by the distributive model; courts are not likely to simply abandon
their recent practice of applying the endorsement test in cases involving evolution instruction, and in certain factual circumstances
(where, for example, a sectarian motivation is clearly evident in the
model’s legislative history) that approach could prove perfectly adequate for revealing constitutional infirmities. It is nevertheless important to note that the distributive model’s approach to evolution
instruction has the affect of muddying the relevant Establishment
Clause analyses such that additional analytical tools for evaluating the
model are needed.
As a consequence of evolution instruction policies becoming increasingly removed from an explicit conflict between evolution and
creationism, courts attempting to evaluate those policies under the
Establishment Clause have been forced to try and fit the square peg
of facially neutral legislation defended on scientific grounds into the
174
round holes of religious purpose and effect.
Although this dilemma has yet to persuade a court to uphold an antievolutionist meas175
ure, it has created a situation where a dynamic and broadening area
of public policy is being reviewed through a relatively static and narrow lens. Apart from whether religion is in fact the driving force be176
hind the ongoing evolution instruction debate, the political and legal contexts in which that debate is actually conducted are too broad
177
to be treated as a single constitutional issue.

174
175

176
177

See discussion supra notes 163–169 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Casey Luskin, Does Challenging Darwin Create Constitutional Jeopardy? A Comprehensive Survey of Case Law Regarding the Teaching of Biological Origins, 32 HAMLINE L. REV. 1, 5
(2009) (noting “that the courts have . . . ‘consistently supported the teaching of evolution’”).
See supra Part II (discussing the doctrinal history of the evolution instruction debate as
focusing solely on the issue of religious establishment).
One possible approach would be to reconsider the scope of current Establishment Clause
doctrine to accommodate concerns that even the distributive model is at its core the
product of attempts by lawmakers to facilitate the presentation of religious theories of
human origins in science classes. While this approach may certainly be worthwhile, and
has been addressed in previous publications by the author, see Virelli, Making Lemonade,
supra note 115, it is not mutually exclusive with the animating position for this Article,
namely that the distributive model is better viewed in the context of administrative law
principles.
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V. NEW ISSUES UNDER THE DISTRIBUTIVE MODEL
After decades of legal battles waged on the familiar ground of the
Establishment Clause, evolution instruction policy has diversified
from straightforward conflicts about religion in public school classrooms. The new face of antievolutionist policy, the distributive model, is better analogized to a complicated regulatory regime than a legislative prescription. This is significant not only because it constitutes
a sea-change in perspective on the evolution instruction debate, but
also because it avoids the analytical brambles presented by efforts to
confront questions relating to administrative law on purely religious
grounds. Approaching the distributive model in its natural habitat as
an administrative measure captures new and important political and
legal issues at no expense to considerations of the Establishment
Clause, whatever its continuing relevance.
A. Political Legitimacy
The first of these issues is the political legitimacy of the distributive model, both at the statutory/regulatory level where authority is
transferred to individual educators to make decisions about what
should be taught and in the classrooms where those decisions are ac178
tually made.
Political legitimacy depends on agencies and their
178

At the statutory level, access to accurate and reliable technical information about the current scientific understanding of human origins is important to standard-setting; the very
idea of encouraging educators to promote critical thinking about any scientific proposition can only be legitimate where a legitimate scientific critique is available, i.e., if a dispute about human origins exists that is grounded in a scientific discipline. Where reasonable scientists each employ the scientific method to reach distinct conclusions, then
legislation or regulation relying on the existence of such a conflict can be considered—at
least in terms of its scientific features—legitimate. By contrast, where policy positions
based on presenting students with a scientific critique of evolution cannot be explained
by reference to reliable scientific information advocating for such a policy, its legitimacy
naturally falls into question. By the same token, the legitimacy of decisions by individual
educators in individual classrooms depends on those educators having access to reliable
scientific information in order to validate their specific decisions regarding how to promote critical thinking about evolution. Those decisions are rendered arbitrary, and thus
illegitimate, where their critique fails to reflect sound science. Therefore, although the
implications of these individual determinations being made in a politically illegitimate
way are far less severe than those at the legislative, standard-setting level, the legitimacy of
individual educators’ policy making function must nonetheless also depend on the quality of the technical information informing those decisions. Due to the fact that political
legitimacy in both the legislative and classroom contexts of the distributive model depends on the reliability of scientific information being used to support those policy decisions, a broader discussion of the model’s political legitimacy is possible without continuing reference to these two distinct levels of policy making. This does not mean that the
potential safeguards against illegitimate application of the distributive model do not vary
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representatives providing reasoned explanations for their decisions.
In the case of the distributive model, the explanations provided in
support are all based on claims of scientific uncertainty regarding the
180
capacity of evolution to explain human origins. Detractors suggest
that no such uncertainty exists and that supporters’ reliance on a
scientific controversy is a pretext for inserting religious ideology into
181
the classroom.
Regardless of which side has the better of the debate, the dispute about the strength of the explanation for the distributive model invites a question about the model’s political legitimacy
that is distinct from whether it represents an unconstitutional estab182
lishment of religion.
This broad question about the distributive model’s legitimacy can
be subdivided into questions of how to determine whether the policy
as it exists is legitimate and, if not, how to make it so. The foundational principles affecting administrative legitimacy are expertise, ac183
countability, efficiency, and consistency.
Each is strongly impli-

179

180
181
182

183

based on whether the model’s legislative or individual policy-making feature is at issue,
but only that we may assume, for present purposes, that the political legitimacy of every
application of the distributive model depends on the reliability of the scientific knowledge informing that process.
See Bressman, Disciplining Delegation, supra note 119, at 485 (“[Administrative law principles] require agencies in general to articulate a basis for their policy determinations
and, in particular, to articulate the standards for those determinations.”); Cary Coglianese & Gary E. Marchant, supra note 119, at 1256 (“Administrative law aspires to bring
reason to agency policymaking.”); see also Jerry L. Mashaw, Small Things Like Reasons Are
Put in a Jar: Reasons and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 17, 24
(2001).
See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 97–107 and accompanying text.
If the scientific controversy explanation is found to be adequate to support the distributive model, there is still room to contend that the policy, although not necessarily designed solely to promote religion, could run afoul of another standard under the Establishment Clause, such as the endorsement test. See Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S.
573, 597 (1989) (defining the endorsement test: “when evaluating the effect of government conduct under the Establishment Clause, we must ascertain whether ‘the challenged governmental action is sufficiently likely to be perceived by adherents of the controlling denominations as an endorsement, and by the nonadherents as a disapproval, of
their individual religious choices.’” (quoting Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 390,
(1985))). On the other hand, if the explanation is found to be inadequate to support the
distributive model as a legitimate exercise of government power under the separation of
powers, the question of establishment of religion is moot, but not resolved. In either
event, an inquiry into the legitimacy of the distributive model is independent, and in no
way exclusive, of Establishment Clause concerns.
See Jost Delbrück, Exercising Public Authority Beyond the State: Transnational Democracy and/or
Alternative Legitimation Strategies?, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 29, 34 (2003) (“[W]e
find several elements and criteria that are held to contribute to the legitimacy of the exercise of public authority. . . . [S]uch criteria are transparency and efficiency of government (or more broadly, public authority), and actions and accountability . . . . Finally, we
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cated in policy environments like the distributive model where scientific issues are central to the policy’s political justification. Agency
expertise is necessary to make the scientific judgment about the reliability of evolutionary theory that drives the distributive model’s pol184
icy outcome.
Accountability, which includes as a prerequisite
185
transparency, refers to the public’s ability to retain control over its
186
government by judging its representatives’ performance in office.

184

185

186

may add expertise as a factor that can contribute to the acceptability of acts of public authorities.”); see also JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 102–103
(1985) (pointing to the courts’ due process analysis after 1970 as promising “transparency, generality, and simplicity . . . it made the guarantee of due process a guarantee of accurate and cost-effective decision making”); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS
REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 242–44 (1990) (stating that “political accountability” is a foundational constitutional principle with regard to statutory interpretation); Harold J. Krent, Reviewing Agency Action for Inconsistency with Prior Rules and
Regulations, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1187, 1212 (1997) (“First, when agencies have limited
their own discretion, review can help ensure that the agency treat similarly situated individuals equivalently, a fundamental principle of public law. Review for consistency furthers the ideal of agency legitimacy.”); Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 134, at 94 (“The Vesting Clause of Article II—by placing the executive in one rather than many presidents—
embodied this judgment. It is therefore clear that the constitutional text and structure
reflect commitments to the unitary virtues of coordination, accountability, and efficiency
in government.”).
Int’l Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring) (noting the existence of “cases of great technological complexity” in administrative law); Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 134, at 99–100 (“To be sure, many insist on technocratic rationality—on the importance of expertise in helping people to make informed
judgments about the relations between means and ends. This is an enduring theme in
administrative law. . . . [T]he absence of expertise, or the distortion of expert judgment
through anecdote and interest-group power, is an important obstacle to a wellfunctioning system of regulatory law.” (citations omitted)). Although most pronounced
in the technocratic model of administrative law that arose during the New Deal, see
LANDIS, supra note 139, at 23 (“With the rise of regulation, the need for expertness became dominant . . . .”); Rabin, supra note 139, at 1252 (“As in its initial phase, the New
Deal continued its propensity to address particularized areas of unrest through regulation
by experts . . . .”), expertise remains a critical feature of any theory of administrative governance. Even public choice or “civic republican” theory, which relies on the resolution
of competing interests and viewpoints rather than the opinions of particular experts to
set policy, requires access to reliable information to better inform those interests and positions. See generally Croley, supra note 123; Seidenfeld, supra note 123, at 1512.
Molly Beutz, Functional Democracy: Responding to Failures of Accountability, 44 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 387, 428 (2003) (describing transparency as a “precondition” to accountability and
explaining that “[t]ransparency and access to information facilitate accountability because citizens need information to know when to hold which leaders accountable for
what decisions”); Mark Fenster, The Opacity Of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 899
(2006) (“The most significant consequences [of government transparency] flow from the
public’s increased ability to monitor government activity and hold officials . . . accountable for their actions.”).
Professor Bressman describes the principle of accountability as follows:
Perhaps the best understanding of accountability is not that it requires elected officials to make policy decisions simply because they are responsive to the people.
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In order for the public to make that judgment in the administrative
context, it must be privy to an administrative policy maker’s explanations for their exercise of authority, and those explanations must be
rational and well-informed. This is especially true where, as with the
distributive model, the explanations are scientific in nature; technical
explanations are more difficult for the lay public to evaluate on their
own and thus must be accurate and reliable in order to foster true
agency transparency and accountability. The efficiency principle ac187
knowledges the importance of responsive, timely government. This
is important with respect to decisions based on scientific information
because scientific inquiries are often complex and aimed at address188
ing time-sensitive issues of public policy. It is especially so for education policies like the distributive model, which must be implemented so as not to interfere with the structure of individual classes
or the academic calendar as a whole. Finally, consistency, the requirement that like cases be treated alike, is a fundamental feature of

187

188

Rather, it requires elected officials to make policy decisions because they are subject to the check of the people if they do not discharge their duties in a sufficiently
public-regarding and otherwise rational, predictable, and fair manner. Thus, accountability can be understood to enable voters not only to consider whether
elected officials have maximized popular preferences in making or executing the
law, but also, and equally importantly, whether those officials have inappropriately
favored narrow interests in doing so.
Bressman, Beyond Accountability, supra note 117, at 499 (citing Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 565–71 (1998)); see also
SUNSTEIN, supra note 183, at 187 (“The principle of political accountability has an unmistakable foundation in Article I of the Constitution, and it is an overriding structural
commitment of the document. The principle has foundations as well in assessments of
institutional performance. At the same time, it operates to counteract characteristic failures in the regulatory process.”); Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 134, at 94 (“Accountability
and avoidance of factionalism, then, are two central values of the framers’ original executive.”); id. at 119 (arguing that a unitary executive “fits well with important political and
constitutional values, including the interests in political accountability”). See generally Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23
(1995) (noting the constitutional importance of accountability). In administrative law,
this typically involves voters expressing their dissatisfaction with elected officials who supported particular administrators.
Glen O. Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 516 (1970) (“The
goal of efficiency needs no explanation or defense. If it cannot be considered an ultimate concern of administrative law that tasks be accomplished with the minimum expenditure of time and resources, it is nevertheless a matter of large importance.”).
See SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISERS AS POLICYMAKERS 77–78
(1990); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, In Defense of Regulatory Peer Review, 84 WASH. U. L. REV.
1, 30–31 (2006) (“Indeed, the deadlines . . . frequently placed on agency decisionmaking
acknowledge the pressing need in many cases to intervene on policy problems. Agencies
already have difficulty meeting those deadlines . . . .”).
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rational decision making, impartiality, and fairness, and in turn is es189
sential to administrative legitimacy.
Considered against the backdrop of these principles, the distributive model demonstrates significant weaknesses. The most obvious
and oft-discussed is the problem of agency expertise. The overwhelming majority of current scientific experts support Darwinism as
190
the only scientifically sound explanation of human origins, and opponents of evolution instruction have yet to present an alternative to
191
ReDarwinism that survives scrutiny under the scientific method.
189

190

191

Professor Dotan described the impact of consistency on administrative legitimacy as follows:
The requirement of consistency . . . that like cases be treated alike—is fundamental both for bureaucratic decisionmaking and for legal systems at large. It has
strong intuitive appeal to our sense of justice, and is intertwined with the notion of
fairness. It is a due process value. It is fundamental to the notions of prompt administrative order, rationality in administrative decisionmaking, and impartiality in
adjudicative proceedings. Under the idea of the rule of law, administrative decisions are expected to be made with reference to a system of clearly stated, previously established, and publicly promulgated set of legal rules and principles—in
a fashion that preserves the coherence and predictability of the process of decisionmaking. Inconsistency in administrative decisionmaking (that is, where agencies fail to treat similar cases alike) defies the values of the rule of law. Such inconsistency may signal serious flaws in the administrative process and provide
several grounds for judicial intervention to rectify such flaws. Inconsistent administrative decisions may point to improper motives on behalf of the decisionmaker,
discriminatory bias in favor or against some participants, or, at the very least, a lack
of proper management and coherent implementation of agency law. There is
hardly any more suitable reason to label the administrative process as ‘arbitrary
and capricious’ than in the case of a process that treats like cases differently. In
addition, consistency in decisionmaking serves as a vital precondition for guaranteeing public faith in government. Finally, consistency in administrative decisionmaking is congruent with the need to protect reasonable expectations and reliance interests on behalf of the members of the public.
Yoav Dotan, Making Consistency Consistent, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 995, 1000–01 (2005); see also
Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CAL. L. REV. 1044, 1105 (1984)
(“Nothing leaves a state agent as much room for venality, hatred, caprice, or carelessness
as the power to ignore the applicable rules.”).
Richard O’Grady, the Executive Director of the American Institute of Biological Sciences,
made this point in a letter objecting to the Louisiana Science Education Act:
The scientific community has long ago reached consensus on evolution. Scientists
from many fields of study agree that evolutionary processes are the accepted scientific explanation for the history and diversity of life on Earth.
Evolution . . . developed through a rigorous scientific process . . . . Scientific scrutiny has
not disproved the theory of evolution . . . it has strengthened and refined the
theory . . . .
Letter from Richard O’ Grady, PhD., Exec. Dir., Am. Inst. of Biological Scis. to Members
of the Bd. of Elementary and Secondary Educ. (June 4, 2009), http://
www.aibs.org/position-statements/20090604_aibs_submits_co_1.html; see Letter from Richard O’Grady, PhD., Exec. Dir., Am. Inst. of Biological Scis. to La. State Representatives,
supra note 97 (“Supernatural explanations for [evolution] are not scientifically testable
and are not science.”).
This is perhaps most evident in the policy move by antievolutionists from intelligent design to the distributive model, which focuses not on presenting alternatives per se, but in-
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gardless of whether a scientific revolution is on the horizon, the
scientific debate about human origins does not appear sufficiently
robust in its current form to legitimize a policy decision based on encouraging students to confront that very debate in public school
192
science classes.
With this expertise problem comes a corresponding accountability
issue. By relying on the existence of a scientific controversy over evolution to support the distributive model, policy makers leave the lay
public with little choice but to evaluate the merits of the decision on
the policy makers’ own scientific terms; the public must either accept
that a scientific dispute about evolution exists or engage the scientific
issue on their own. In neither case are policy makers accountable for
their decision, as the public is forced to either accept at face value the
existence of a scientific controversy involving evolution and, in turn,
the legitimacy of the distributive model, or to engage in an independent scientific investigation of the matter that is likely beyond its
technical competence.
In short, the political legitimacy of the distributive model depends
in no small part on the accuracy and reliability of the scientific in193
formation and conclusions used to inform that policy decision.
This in turn raises questions about how to best promote scientific
quality in decisions about science education. A widely-used and popular approach to dealing with scientific reliability issues related to
194
policy making is the use of independent peer review.
Peer review
involves the consideration by independent experts in the relevant

192

193

194

stead on introducing students to a wide range of views about evolution. See MODEL
ACADEMIC FREEDOM STATUTE ON EVOLUTION, supra note 84, § 3 (providing that teachers
in elementary and secondary schools “shall have the affirmative right and freedom to
present scientific information pertaining to the full range of scientific views regarding biological and chemical evolution”).
The analysis may very well be different where the controversy over evolution is presented
in non-science classes, see Wexler, supra note 5, at 787, but that is not the goal of the distributive model or its supporters; the model is specifically targeted at finding ways to introduce uncertainty about evolution into science instruction. See, e.g., Louisiana Science
Education Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:285.1.B(1) (2008) (focusing on promoting critical thinking in science classes, in particular with regard to “scientific theories . . . including . . . evolution, the origins of life, global warming, and human cloning”).
See Louis J. Virelli III, Scientific Peer Review and Administrative Legitimacy, 61 ADMIN. L. REV.
723, 754–56 (2009) [hereinafter Virelli, Scientific Peer Review] (discussing how reliable
scientific information is crucial to ensuring the expertise necessary to foster legitimacy in
agency policy decisions).
See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-99-99, FEDERAL RESEARCH: PEER
REVIEW PRACTICES AT FEDERAL SCIENCE AGENCIES VARY 18–70 (1999) [hereinafter GAO
PEER REVIEW REPORT] (describing varying peer review practices at twelve federal agencies); Jasanoff, supra note 188, at 84–180 (describing scientific advisory processes of the
EPA and FDA).
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field of the scientific “inputs” on which the policy—in this case the
195
In addition to questions of peer redistributive model—is based.
view’s general utility in this context, there are related issues of what
form of peer review is best suited to promote scientific accuracy and
196
reliability in evolution instruction policy.
In cases where the political position at issue was a decision by an
individual educator as to how to approach the evolution debate in
the classroom, questions of scientific reliability and accuracy are
equally important, but the second-order issues of how to address the
problem change. Rather than using scientific peer review to evaluate
each individual decision by an educator, legitimacy issues at that level
may necessitate additional policy measures requiring specific training
either in the details of the scientific controversy, the legal limitations
on classroom dialogue about topics like creationism, or both. Without these protective measures, scientific reliability and accuracy could
suffer in ways that may bring the legitimacy of the entire distributive
model into question.
In addition to problems centered on scientific reliability and accuracy, there are accountability concerns arising from the distributive
model’s procedural regime that pose potential problems for its legitimacy. While the drafters of the model’s statutory or regulatory
197
framework may be elected officials who are operating under procedural requirements to ensure transparency and public participation
in the drafting process, the final decision regarding how to teach the
concept of human origins is left to individual teachers in individual
198
classrooms. The distributive model does not include any generally195

196

197
198

See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, Prescribing the Right Dose of Peer Review for the Endangered Species Act, 83
NEB. L. REV. 398, 402 (2004) (“Peer review is generally described as a scientifically rigorous review and critique of a study’s methods, results, and findings that is conducted by
others in the relevant field who have the requisite training and expertise, who have no
pecuniary or other disqualifying bias with respect to the topic, and who are independent
of the persons who performed the study.”); see also GAO PEER REVIEW REPORT 4 (explaining that although there is “no written definition of peer review that applies across the
federal government . . . all of the agencies’ definitions . . . contained the fundamental
concept of a review of technical or scientific merit by individuals with sufficient technical
competence and no unresolved conflict of interest.”).
Even where peer review programs exist to support science education policy, questions of
how peer review should be employed remain highly relevant to the broader question of
the policy’s political legitimacy. See generally Virelli, Scientific Peer Review, supra note 193.
See ASIMOW & LEVIN, supra note 118, at 373 (explaining that some state constitutions expressly create administrative agencies or allow for the direct election of administrators).
See, e.g., Louisiana Science Education Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:285.1.B(1), (2) (2008)
(stating that the State Board of Education “shall allow and assist teachers . . . to create and
foster an environment . . . that promotes critical thinking . . . of scientific theories,” including offering “support and guidance” for those efforts (emphasis added)).
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applicable guidelines for how teachers should approach the topic of
evolution instruction, and for reasons motivated by judicial treatments of previous evolution instruction policies under the Establishment Clause, such generally-applicable statements by lawmakers are
199
no longer considered a viable part of antievolutionist policy.
The result is that the accountability of policy makers under the
distributive model is lacking in two ways. The first is their public accountability prior to making a decision about evolution instruction.
Even before confronting an evolution issue in the classroom, the
principle of accountability requires that the inputs of educators into
the policy-making process be transparent to the public. These inputs
would include whatever sources of information and knowledge each
individual educator may have that is germane to their decision making regarding evolution instruction. Under the distributive model,
however, teacher training and knowledge relevant to the problem is,
at best, unclear. Public training programs will almost certainly not be
available, as they would run afoul of the very purpose of the distributive model—to enable criticism of evolutionary theory within public
school science classes without taking any specific position as to how
200
human origins must or should be taught.
Without such training,
any representations about teachers’ personal understanding of the
relevant legal issues should be viewed skeptically. It is unrealistic to
think that elementary and secondary education science teachers can
become experts in the constitutional issues surrounding evolution instruction even with, let alone without, some measure of formal training in the area. As a result, pre-decisional accountability is lacking
from the distributive model.
Post-decisional accountability is no more prevalent. Decisions
about how to treat the controversy over evolution instruction are
made on an ad hoc basis under the distributive model by educators
who are not obligated to record or report their decisions and whose
only audience is a classroom of children. Although a particularly diligent constituency could seek ways to make a classroom more open
to the public, or at least to the students’ guardians, there are no
guarantees that this approach would provide an accurate or adequate
account of classroom conduct, nor is it without negative educational
consequences. Relying on the diligence of the local community
199

200

See discussion supra Part II (describing the movement in antievolutionist policy away from
legislative proscriptions regarding evolution in response to federal court rulings invalidating these policy measures under the Establishment Clause); see also discussion supra note
111 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra Part II.
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without government mandates supporting transparency is not only
unreliable as a means of classroom monitoring, but may lead to negative pedagogical consequences that either diminish or outweigh the
benefits of teachers being made more accountable. In sum, accountability is a problem under the distributive model and is only made
readily apparent by viewing evolution instruction as a challenge to be
addressed by reference to administrative law principles.
The third consideration pertaining to political legitimacy, efficiency, is less of a concern for the distributive model, but may still
prove problematic. By empowering individual educators to make decisions about evolution instruction in real time, the distributive model is potentially as efficient as fact-specific policy making could conceivably be. To the extent each issue pertaining to the teaching of
evolution that arises in a science classroom is unique, then transferring authority to decision makers who are intimately familiar with the
issue is a highly efficient way to address the problem. Where issues
begin to recur, however, inconsistent decisions could create problems
for the efficient operation of the entire policy-making regime. Inconsistent results could lead to confusion among the teachers as well
as information contamination from students across classrooms that
could frustrate the educational effectiveness of not only the model,
201
but of the science class as a whole.
Where the distributive model
threatens its own consistency, it likewise threatens its ability to function efficiently and, in turn, legitimately.
Consistent decision making within the distributive model is a
foundational feature of its legitimacy independent from its effect on
202
administrative efficiency. Absent some attempt to unify educators’
approach to deciding questions of evolution instruction—an approach that the distributive model seeks to avoid for constitutional
203
reasons —there are no safeguards within the distributive model to
ensure even a threshold level of consistency in those decisions. The
201

202

203

Intra-classroom uniformity is preferred because the prospect of some students in a classroom being taught something substantively different about human origins than other
students in the same classroom could lead, at a minimum, to a pedagogically absurd result.
See Dotan, supra note 189, at 1000–01 (describing the impact of consistency on administrative legitimacy); Krent, supra note 183, at 1212 (“First, when agencies have limited
their own discretion, review can help ensure that the agency treat similarly situated individuals equivalently, a fundamental principle of public law. Review for consistency furthers the ideal of agency legitimacy.”).
See discussion supra Part II (describing the movement in antievolutionist policy away from
explicit treatment of religion in response to federal court rulings invalidating these policy
measures under the Establishment Clause); see also discussion supra note 111 and accompanying text.
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distributive model is premised on the transfer of authority over evolution instruction directly to the classroom level, without any guiding
principle beyond the desire to promote “critical thinking” about the
204
sciences.
Unless a rational (i.e., legitimizing) explanation can be
provided for why a potentially random series of pedagogical choices
is desirable, a lack of decisional consistency threatens the model’s
viability.
These potential difficulties with the political legitimacy of the distributive model highlight the importance of adopting an administrative perspective in evaluating the model. The application of administrative law principles increases the likelihood that questions of
legitimacy will be included within the analysis of the distributive
model in the first instance, and provides a useful platform from
which to guide the development of evolution education policy as it
moves beyond the blunt approach of Establishment Clause challenges.
B. Additional Questions
There are a number of other important issues triggered by the
decision to view the distributive model in light of administrative law
principles. Although none of these is as foundational as the question
of political legitimacy, each provides fuel for future discussion
grounded in the understanding that the distributive model cannot be
adequately evaluated, as its predecessors were, solely under the Establishment Clause.
1. Judicial Review
Viewing the distributive model from an administrative vantage
point raises important questions about its treatment in the courts.
Administrative pronouncements are subject to a complex system of
judicial review in which agency determinations of law, fact, and policy

204

See, e.g., Louisiana Science Education Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:285.1.B(1), (2) (2008)
(stating that the State Board of Education “shall allow and assist teachers . . . to create and
foster an environment . . . that promotes critical thinking . . . of scientific theories,” including offering “support and guidance” for those efforts (emphasis added)); see also supra note 80 (discussing the importance of individual teachers, rather than administrative
entities such as school boards, acting as policy makers under the distributive model).
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are all subject to standards of review that are potentially different
205
from one another and from their counterparts in Article III courts.
The most important of these standards for the distributive model
206
is the arbitrary and capricious (or abuse of discretion) standard.
The distributive model’s most controversial feature is its grant of
power to individual teachers to exercise their discretion in promoting
critical thinking about the sciences. More precisely, the features of
the distributive model most likely to be challenged are the higherlevel statutory or regulatory decisions to promote critical thinking
about evolution in science classes and the second-order decisions of
individual teachers as to how to achieve that goal in the classroom.
Neither of these determinations will likely raise purely legal issues
(other than Establishment Clause challenges, which are subject to de
207
novo review), as the model’s statutory or regulatory framework gives
208
teachers wide latitude to promote critical thinking about evolution.
205

206

207

208

See supra note 122 and accompanying text. But see David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96
VA. L. REV. 135 (2010) (arguing that judicial review of administrative actions is better described and performed through a reasonableness standard).
ASIMOW & LEVIN, supra note 118, at 567 (describing the arbitrary and capricious and
abuse of discretion standards as “interchangeable”); see Citizens to Pres. Overton Park,
Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (“Section 706(2)(A) requires a finding that the actual choice made was not ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law.’ To make this finding the court must consider whether the decision
was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear
error of judgment.” (citation omitted)); see also 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006) (originally encated
as Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237) (describing the standards
of review under the federal Administrative Procedure Act); MODEL STATE ADMIN.
PROCEDURE ACT § 15 (“The court may reverse or modify the decision [of the agency]
if . . . the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are . . . arbitrary or
capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.”). “[T]he [administrative procedure] acts of most states are based on the 1961
MSAPA.” Bonfield, supra note 149, at 123 n. 5.
See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B) (requiring courts to overturn “agency action, findings, and
conclusions found to be—contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity”).
In cases where a student does challenge either the regulatory structure of the distributive
model as outside its statutory mandate or a decision by an individual teacher on the
grounds that it is not permitted by the governing statute or regulation, different questions of judicial review may arise. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (outlining a two-step test for judicial review of an
agency’s interpretation of its enabling statute in a rulemaking proceeding); ASIMOW &
LEVIN, supra note 118, at 526–27 (providing an overview of state law dealing with judicial
review of agency interpretations of statutes, and stating that most states employ a less deferential approach to administrative interpretations of statutes than was prescribed for
federal courts in Chevron); see also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (addressing the question of judicial review of an agency’s interpretation of a statute in the
context of an informal adjudication); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997) (holding that
an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation in an informal adjudication deserves
judicial deference).
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Regardless of whether they are treated as factual or policy-related,
each of these determinations is subject to arbitrary and capricious re209
As a result, the distributive model will most likely be chalview.
lenged on grounds that require judicial scrutiny under the arbitrary
210
or capricious standard.
The impact of arbitrary and capricious review on the distributive
model could be felt on at least two levels. First is the consideration of
the model’s broader policy objective of promoting critical thinking
211
about evolution in science classes. As an initial matter, where this
broader statement takes the form of a statute, arbitrary and capricious review will likely not apply, as legislative policy choices are tradi209

210

211

The arbitrary and capricious standard may be applied to review agency findings of fact in
informal proceedings, see Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (reviewing a regulation promulgated by informal rulemaking
procedures under the arbitrary and capricious standard), and is largely indistinguishable
from the substantial evidence standard used to review fact finding in formal adjudications. See also Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys., 745 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (downplaying the distinction between “substantial evidence” and “arbitrary and capricious” review of agency fact-finding); ASIMOW & LEVIN, supra note 118, at 567. In the case of the distributive model, then, the arbitrary and capricious standard is most significant because it applies not only to policy determinations
associated with the model, but to challenges based on fact finding by the agency in drafting the model’s regulatory framework.
Arbitrary and capricious review may not be the only standard, however, that will impact
the distributive model. As discussed supra at note 208, different questions of judicial review may arise, for example, in cases where a student challenges either the regulatory
structure of the distributive model as outside its statutory mandate, or a decision by an
individual teacher on the grounds that it is not permitted by the governing statute or
regulation. Moreover, there is a remote possibility that an individual teacher’s authority
under the distributive model could be interpreted to be so broadly discretionary as to lie
outside the realm of judicial review altogether. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(2) (exempting from
judicial review agency actions “committed to agency discretion by law”). But see Webster
v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 600 (1988) (explaining that agency administrative action is only unreviewable on the basis that it has been committed to agency discretion where the “statute
is drawn [so that a] court would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the
agency’s exercise of discretion”); ASIMOW & LEVIN, supra note 118, at 634 (describing
state law on whether a decision is committed to agency discretion as reflecting “many of
the same tensions that appear in federal cases”). In the case of the distributive model,
the stated purpose to promote critical thinking, although a broad grant of discretion, is
not so subjective as to be immune from meaningful judicial review.
Regardless of the precise standards that would apply in every conceivable challenge
to the distributive model, it is sufficient for purposes of this discussion to highlight two
facts pertaining to the distributive model and judicial review. First is that policy and/or
factual decisions by administrators and individual teachers under the model are likely to
be subject to arbitrary and capricious review. Second is that judicial review presents important issues for the distributive model, and that these important questions of judicial
review are only made apparent when the model is considered in connection with principles of administrative law.
See, e.g., Louisiana Science Education Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:285.1.B(1), (2)
(2008).
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212

tionally not subject to judicial review.
Where the same statement
originates or, as in Louisiana, is essentially duplicated in an adminis213
trative regulation, judicial review as understood in the administra214
tive context—including arbitrary and capricious review—applies.
In those cases, although still not likely to run afoul of the arbitrary
and capricious standard, it is possible that a reviewing court could
conclude that the current state of scientific thought is not adequately
balanced on both sides of the evolution debate to justify the promotion of “critical thinking” about the subject at the elementary and
215
secondary education levels.
212

213
214

215

See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113,
116 (1998) (“[A]t least under classical schools of interpretation, courts deciding statutory
cases are bound to follow commands and policies embodied in the enacted text—
commands and policies that the courts did not create and cannot change.”); Frank H.
Easterbrook, The Supreme Court 1983 Term—Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98
HARV. L. REV. 4, 60 (1984) (“Judges must be honest agents of the political branches.
They carry out decisions they do not make.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the
Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 415 (1989) (“According to the most prominent
conception of the role of the courts in statutory construction, judges are agents or servants of the legislature. . . . The judicial task is to discern and apply a judgment made by
others, most notably the legislature.”).
See Bulletin 741-Louisiana Handbook for School Administrators, Curriculum and Instruction, Science Education, 35:8 La. Reg. 1476 (Aug. 20, 2009).
As discussed supra note 210, review of a regulation employing the higher-level policy
statements of the distributive model will also be available for its compliance with the statutory mandate that empowered the rulemaking in the first place. As an initial matter,
this is a very different question on judicial review than the question of whether the policy
decision to encourage critical thinking about evolution is arbitrary and capricious; the issue of whether the agency enacted a rule within its statutory mandate depends on the
specific language of the statute as well as the reasonableness of the agency’s interpretation of the statutory language. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Moreover, as a practical matter, in instances in which the distributive model has originated as a statute—like Louisiana’s Science Education Act, for
instance—the language of the statute and regulation have been nearly identical, thereby
making clear that the regulation is within statutory boundaries. See 35:8 La. Reg. 1476.
This represents an additional, but slightly different, evaluation of the scientific underpinnings of evolution than that employed in the analysis of the distributive model’s political
legitimacy. See discussion supra Part V.A.
It is far less objectionable to focus on scientific debates that may, like evolution, appear one-sided with more sophisticated audiences at, for example, the collegiate or graduate level. But where elementary and secondary school students are involved, there is a
strong argument for avoiding discussions of controversies outside the scientific mainstream for fear of confusing students without the educational tools or experience to
process conflicting information. A study of critical thinking among college and graduate
students indicates a similar conclusion with regard to post-secondary students, let alone
elementary and high school students:
The college seniors . . . did not consistently base their arguments on evidence and
did not demonstrate an understanding of the role of evidence in making interpretations and judgments. Their . . . assumption [was] that because there are many
possible answers to every question and no absolutely certain way to adjudicate between competing answers, knowledge claims are simply idiosyncratic to the indi-
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A far greater potential problem created by arbitrary and capricious review of the distributive model is the impact of judicial scrutiny
on the model’s choice to empower individual educators in individual
216
classrooms to make decisions regarding how to teach evolution.
While there is nothing inherently arbitrary or capricious about these
decisions, it is unlikely that there will be any administrative record or
other documentation supporting each individual educator’s determination, thereby making such decisions increasingly vulnerable to
217
arbitrariness review. Moreover, the sheer magnitude and variety of
these decisions invites significant intrusion by the judiciary into the
daily operations of public school science classes. This intrusion could
not only cause profound confusion among teachers and students, but
may also prove to have little benefit to the participants, as students
who have been exposed to an unprincipled account of the scientific
underpinnings of human origins may or may not be present to experience the effects of a judicial remedy. Finally, from a wider political
perspective, the threat of legal challenges to specific decisions may
cause teachers to refrain from pursuing the model’s mandate altogether. In short, viewing the distributive model as an administrative
enactment reveals issues pertaining to judicial review of the model
that are important to its effectiveness and viability, and that are not
readily apparent when the model is perceived solely in the Establishment Clause context.
2. Delegation
Delegation is a concept that is most prevalent in administrative
law, but is founded on constitutional concerns. In order to accom-

216

217

vidual. In other words, an answer to an ill-structured problem is seen as merely an
opinion. . . . The graduate students . . . also fell short . . . . The logic at this stage
is that different perspectives (e.g., different academic disciplines) have different
rules of inquiry and thus yield different but equally legitimate interpretations. Beliefs are strictly relative to a particular perspective. Students holding these assumptions often cannot identify criteria by which to judge one interpretation as
being more adequate or useful than another.
Patricia M. King et al., Critical Thinking Among College and Graduate Students, 13 REV. OF
HIGHER EDUC. 167, 179 (1990).
See discussion supra note 80 (explaining why the distributive model shifts policy-making
authority to individual teachers rather than, for example, administrative agencies like
school boards).
See, e.g., Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971) (concluding that arbitrariness review required judicial consideration of the “full administrative
record” before the agency at the time of its decision, and that if the “bare record” did not
“disclose the factors that were considered” by the agency in rendering its decision, “it may
be necessary for the District Court to require some explanation”).
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modate the expansion of administrative government, courts on both
the state and federal level have developed delegation doctrines designed to set standards for determining when a transfer of power
from a constitutionally-mandated branch of government to an administrative agency exceeds the boundaries set by the principle of separa218
This is an important question for the distributive
tion of powers.
model because one of its most powerful policy features—and a strong
219
source of its appeal to antievolutionists —is derived from its delegation of policy-making authority from legislators or traditional regulators to individual educators.
220
To the extent that the model delegates primarily adjudicative
power to public school teachers, it raises questions about whether
those teachers’ decisions about evolution instruction must be
brought, as a constitutional matter, in the courts. Because the current form of the distributive model employs informal adjudication,
rather than trial-like adversarial proceedings to set evolution instruc221
tion policy, neither federal nor state law in the area points to a se222
rious concern about the delegation of judicial power.
223
If the distributive model is treated as a legislative delegation, a
different analysis is required. At the federal level, the legislative nondelegation doctrine has been interpreted exceedingly broadly, permitting delegations to agencies in every instance in which Congress
has articulated an “intelligible principle” to guide those agencies in
224
The Court has applied
exercising their newly-acquired discretion.
the intelligible principle standard equally broadly, causing some to

218

219
220
221
222

223
224

See ASIMOW & LEVIN, supra note 118, at 374 (“The [legislative] nondelegation doctrine
invokes both separation of powers and checks and balances arguments.”). Some state
constitutions expressly create administrative agencies or allow for the direct election of
administrators. In these instances, delegation is far less of a concern, if at all. See id. at
373.
See discussion supra note 80 (explaining the importance to the distributive model of using
individual teachers as policy makers).
For a discussion of the adjudicative and regulatory features of the distributive model, see
supra notes 145–50 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra notes 145–50 and accompanying text (discussing the adjudicative features of the distributive model).
See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 834–35 (1986)
(outlining the relevant factors in evaluating whether agency adjudication unconstitutionally interferes with the operation of the federal courts); ASIMOW & LEVIN, supra note 118,
at 404 (addressing state law doctrine of adjudicative delegation).
See discussion supra notes 145–50 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 458 (2000) (applying the intelligible principle standard to uphold an air quality standard promulgated by the EPA against
a delegation challenge).
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describe the federal delegation doctrine as virtually a dead letter.
Individual states, however, have been much more restrictive in per226
mitting legislative delegation. While the distributive model’s stated
goal of promoting critical thinking appears adequate to meet the
federal standard, the model is much more likely to be enacted at the
state level, where the wider variation of standards and attitudes about
delegation increases the possibility that legitimate questions will arise
concerning the model’s delegation of power.
Even if the distributive model does not run afoul of existing state
or federal delegation doctrine, delegation offers a unique and useful
window into the distributive model. In a case like the distributive
model where delegation is such a critical feature of the policy, it is
useful to maintain a perspective that encourages the ongoing consideration of the role that delegation plays in the model. Perhaps even
more important, however, is the fact that continuing to focus on the
distributive model’s delegation of power to individual educators highlights still more important questions that may otherwise have been
overlooked.
a. Procedural Due Process
The distributive model’s delegation of authority to individual
teachers sheds light on the possible relevance of another constitutional issue—whether students’ and/or parents’ procedural due
225

226

See David Schoenbrod, Politics and the Principle That Elected Legislators Should Make the Laws,
26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 239, 249 (2003) (describing Whitman v. American Trucking
Ass’ns as “seeming to foreswear any intention to block delegation to administrative agencies”); id. at 250 (“One way to read the modern delegation cases is that the delegation
doctrine is now only a ghost.”); see also Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 192
(1943) (holding that the Communications Act of 1934 was not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority because its instructions to the Federal Communications
Commission to act in the “public interest, convenience, or necessity” constituted a constitutional intelligible principle); Richard W. Murphy, Separation Of Powers and the Horizontal
Force of Precedent, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1075, 1083 (2003) (“The courts have . . . ceded
almost plenary authority to Congress to delegate as much discretionary power as it sees
fit. The nondelegation doctrine’s current, dead-letter form suggests that it would be almost impossible for Congress to grant the courts an unconstitutional amount of power . . . .” (citation omitted)).
See Gary J. Greco, Standards or Safeguards: A Survey of the Delegation Doctrine in the States, 8
ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 567, 578 (1994) (“The state supreme courts historically have used the
delegation doctrine to a greater extent than the U.S. Supreme Court to strike down legislative delegations of power. Traditionally, while the federal government almost always
has found broad delegations constitutional, the state courts have upheld broad delegations of power more reluctantly.” (citations omitted)); see also ASIMOW & LEVIN, supra note
118, at 391 (“The nondelegation doctrine has much greater practical significance at the
state level than at the federal level.”).
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process rights have been violated by an educator’s decision to present
information that is critical of, or constitutes an alternative to, evolu227
tion. The distributive model is at least potentially understood as an
228
adjudicative policy-making regime; it empowers individual educators to make contemporaneous decisions about what it means to
think critically about evolution and how to introduce students to this
229
critical approach.
This adjudicative feature of the model implicates procedural due
process protections—the right to be notified and heard before being
230
deprived of a constitutionally-protected interest —that do not exist
231
in a legislative or rule-making context. The Court in Mathews v. El232
dridge articulated a three-part test for determining whether procedural due process requirements are met. The Mathews test weighs the
individual’s protected interest against the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest and the government’s interest in maintaining the
233
existing procedural regime. Under that test, the distributive model
appears to trigger some significant due process concerns. For example, any decision by a teacher to engage the evolution debate by reference to the biblical or any other religiously-based explanation of
human origins could trigger the students’ First Amendment liberty
234
interest in being free from government establishment of religion.
227

228
229
230

231

232
233
234

This issue was addressed in greater detail in an earlier publication by the author. See
Louis J. Virelli III, Evolutionary Due Process, 104 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 251 (2010),
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2010/2/LRColl2010n2
Virelli.pdf.
For a more detailed explanation of the distributive model’s adjudicative features, see supra
notes 145–50 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III (describing the distributive model).
“For more than a century the central meaning of procedural due process has been clear:
‘Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they
may enjoy that right they must first be notified.’” Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80
(1972) (quoting Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223, 233 (1863)).
See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 446 (1915) (distinguishing between legislative conduct and that in which a “relatively small number of persons
was concerned, who were exceptionally affected, in each case upon individual grounds,
and it was held that they had a right to hearing.”).
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
See id.
See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672 (1977) (defining a “liberty interest” under
procedural due process as, inter alia, any “interest within the protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment”); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (incorporating the Estabth
lishment Clause into the Due Process Clause of the 14 Amendment). It is important to
remember that the presence of a constitutionally-protected interest does not mean that a
constitutional violation has occurred. As discussed supra Part IV.C, the facially-neutral
and indeterminate nature of the distributive model renders it more difficult to evaluate
(and thus invalidate) under the Establishment Clause. That does not mean, however,
that Establishment Clause challenges to the distributive model or its implementation by
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Moreover, when the decision as to how to engage the evolution debate is made by individual teachers, the risk of erroneous deprivation
of that interest is significant; individuals who are untrained in the
Constitution and are asked to make contemporaneous decisions
about how to address questions of evolution instruction are highly
likely to overstep their constitutional bounds without the presence of
235
procedural protections. Finally, the government has little if any in236
terest in allowing these decisions to be made without any process.
The distributive model is generally silent with regard to how a student or parent may pursue an Establishment Clause challenge to an
237
educator’s approach to evolution instruction, and there is no obvious reason why such decisions must be made quickly and without
prior deliberation. Delaying a teacher’s treatment of the evolution
debate may be inconvenient in terms of the lesson plan for that class
238
and may pose additional administrative costs, but when weighed
against the students’ liberty interests and the high probability that
those interests will be threatened without additional process, at least
some opportunity for pre-decisional legal process in the form of notice and a hearing is constitutionally required.
The likelihood of success of due process challenges to educational
decisions under the distributive model, in conjunction with the facts
that such challenges are available to students every time an educator
chooses to engage the evolution debate and that even a successful defense does not insulate a school or educator against a subsequent Es-
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individual educators will cease, nor does it say anything about whether those challenges—
meritorious or not—are constitutionally entitled to some measure of process beyond what
the school or school district has already made available.
See, e.g., Mathews, 424 U.S. at 343 (“Central to the evaluation of any administrative process
is the nature of the relevant inquiry.”); id. at 343–44 (finding additional procedural protections necessary where “a wide variety of information may be deemed relevant, and issues of witness credibility and veracity often are critical to the decisionmaking process”).
See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (“An essential principle of due process is that a deprivation of life, liberty, or property ‘be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.’” (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950))).
The regulations accompanying the Louisiana Science Education Act make some provisions for challenging the use of supplemental materials by science teachers, but are silent
with regard to what process is available for students or parents challenging a teacher’s
classroom presentation about evolution. Bulletin 741-Louisiana Handbook for School
Administrators, Curriculum and Instruction, Science Education, 35:8 La. Reg. 1477 (Aug.
20, 2009) (outlining procedures by which “[a]ny Louisiana citizen may challenge [supplemental] materials used” to teach about human origins).
See, e.g., Mathews, 424 U.S. at 347 (“In striking the appropriate due process balance the
final factor to be assessed is the public interest. This includes the administrative burden
and other societal costs that would be associated with requiring, as a matter of constitutional right, [additional procedures].”).

Nov. 2010]

JUDGING DARWIN

141

tablishment Clause or other substantive action, may deter educators
from engaging in a scientific critique of evolution where the possibility of only a substantive challenge would not. At minimum, acknowledging the distributive model’s relationship with administrative law
principles is significant because it highlights the importance of the
model’s delegation of decisional authority to individual educators,
which in turn exposes the specter of procedural due process challenges to the exercise of that authority.
b. Municipal Liability and Qualified Immunity
The delegation of policy-making in the distributive model could
also have consequences in civil rights suits against individual educators and school boards relating to the teaching of evolution. Because
the distributive model delegates policy-making authority to individual
teachers in individual classrooms, as opposed to school boards or leg239
islatures, the model could place teachers and their municipal employers in an unusual and potentially detrimental position. Government officials generally retain qualified immunity in suits against
240
them (personally or in their official capacity) for damages.
Qualified immunity applies where an official did not violate any “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable per241
son would have known.”
There is no reason to believe that the
standard or its application to individual teachers will change based on
whether the teacher is acting under the distributive model or some
other evolution instruction policy; if a teacher violates a student’s
rights under the Establishment Clause, she runs the risk of being liable to that student for equitable relief and damages, regardless of the
educational policy regime they are operating within.

239
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241

See discussion supra note 80 (explaining the importance to the distributive model of using
individual teachers as policy makers).
Injunctive relief is also available in these cases and, in many instances, may be a more
common remedy for Establishment Clause violations, but damages are nonetheless a viable remedy under § 1983, see, e.g., Pierce ex rel. Pierce v. Sullivan W. Cent. Sch. Dist., 379
F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2004) (deciding claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged
Establishment Clause violations), and are a more compelling topic for discussion in relation to the distributive model. In cases under the distributive model, where the violation
takes the form of a specific decision by an individual teacher, the value of injunctive relief
may be seriously compromised; once a teacher has engaged in certain conduct, an order
preventing her from repeating that conduct does little to erase existing damage. For that
reason, and because damage claims are more limited in § 1983 suits than equitable remedies, this discussion focuses on damage claims against teachers or school boards based
on conduct performed under the distributive model.
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
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The analysis becomes very different, however, when we consider
municipal liability for the conduct of a teacher under the distributive
model. Municipalities are largely immune from claims based on al242
leged violations by municipal employees. Teachers’ status as policy
makers under the distributive model, however, could dramatically
change the scope of their municipal employers’ (school board’s)
immunity. Municipalities are not immune from allegedly unconstitutional conduct that “implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation or decision officially adopted and promulgated
243
by that body’s officers,” regardless of whether the individual em244
Moreover,
ployee qualifies for immunity in her personal capacity.
whether a government official is a policy maker is defined by refer245
ence to state law. In the case of the distributive model, any alleged
246
damage to students would be the result of decisions by individual
teachers, who are not only empowered, but encouraged, to set evolu247
tion instruction policy in their own classrooms. By empowering individual teachers to act as policy makers as a matter of state law,
school boards may weaken their claims to immunity against suits
based on a teacher’s conduct under the distributive model. This
weakened immunity, in conjunction with the high number of independent policy makers acting under the distributive model, greatly
increases a school board’s exposure to damage suits.
The distributive model’s policy-making regime also creates a potential immunity problem for school boards in the context of suits for
a failure to train teachers that, according to the model, are permitted
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See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (holding that municipalities are
subject to suits for damages only where the alleged violation is the result of a municipal
policy).
Id. at 690.
See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980) (finding that a municipality
cannot assert the good faith of its employees as a grounds for qualified immunity from
suit under § 1983).
See Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989) (“‘[W]hether a particular official has “final policymaking authority” is a question of state law.’” (quoting St. Louis v.
Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112,123 (1988))).
Damages may be difficult to prove for an Establishment Clause violation, but that does
not mean they are unavailable. See, e.g., Pierce ex rel. Pierce v. Sullivan W. Cent. Sch. Dist.,
379 F.3d 56, 58 (2d Cir. 2004) (entertaining allegations of damages based on, inter alia,
humiliation resulting from an alleged violation of the Establishment Clause); Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806, 824 (5th Cir. 1999) (requiring a showing of “compensable harm” before damages may be awarded for an Establishment Clause violation).
See, e.g., Louisiana Science Education Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:285.1.B(1), (2) (2008)
(stating that the State Board of Education “shall allow and assist teachers . . . to create and
foster an environment . . . that promotes critical thinking . . . of scientific theories,” including offering “support and guidance” for those efforts) (emphasis added).

Nov. 2010]

JUDGING DARWIN

143

to exercise wide discretion in making decisions pertaining to evolution instruction. Although suits based on a failure to train require a
showing that the supervisory body demonstrated deliberate indiffe248
rence to the alleged constitutional harm in its failure to train, the
structure of the distributive model makes this standard relatively easy
to meet. The model does not require any training of teachers with
regard to the evolution debate, but it also specifically avoids providing any detailed guidance to teachers for the very purpose of encour249
This approach
aging independence and maximizing discretion.
looks very much like deliberate indifference and, when coupled with
the high number of largely unconstrained actors employed throughout the school system, could lead to a high number of failure to train
suits against school boards.
The delegation issue associated with the distributive model is thus
important not solely because of the significant delegation of power
employed by the model, but because acknowledging the significance
of the model’s delegation of power to individual teachers expands
the landscape against which the model itself may be evaluated. This
in turn leads to other questions that, although not exclusive to administrative law, are significant to the distributive model’s viability
and are far more difficult to identify without administrative principles
guiding the analysis.
In sum, the political legitimacy of the distributive model and the
potential impact of judicial review and delegation on the model’s
function and viability are just a few examples of issues that are not
readily apparent when the policy is considered from a purely religious and constitutional vantage point. By viewing this new generation of evolution instruction policy in light of administrative law principles, we are able to recognize significant questions beyond the
Establishment Clause issues that have traditionally dominated the
evolution instruction debate.
VI. CONCLUSION
The controversy over evolution education in America has focused
on the potential for religious doctrines and ideas to infiltrate public
school science classrooms. More specifically, this debate has concen-
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See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989) (“We hold today that the inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where the failure to
train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police
come into contact.”).
See discussion supra note 80.
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trated on whether attempts to curtail or otherwise challenge evolutionary theory in science classrooms constitute an unconstitutional
establishment of religion under the First Amendment. Although that
question is still an important one, as the religious underpinnings of
the debate are undeniable, recent policy measures surrounding the
debate—specifically, the distributive model of evolution instruction—
suggest that a broader perspective is necessary to avoid being blinded
by Establishment Clause concerns to other, potentially more significant issues.
This Article contends that administrative law principles provide a
more helpful context for evaluating the distributive model. A perspective rooted in administrative law is broad enough to include inquiries about the model’s religious character under the Establishment Clause, while also highlighting other important features of the
distributive model, such as its status as a scientific policy measure and
its dynamic use of rulemaking and adjudication. These other features beg critical questions of political legitimacy and separation of
powers that are beyond the scope of the Establishment Clause. Only
through an analytical perspective that appreciates the significance of
administrative law does the full panoply of issues raised by the distributive model come into view, and is the full range of the model’s
consequences able to be adequately understood.

